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INFORMED CONSENT FOR ALL! NO EXCEPTIONS
DOUGLAS ANDREW GRIMM"
I. INTRODUCTION
Less than 200 years ago, physicians were cautioned that "[y]our patient has no
more right to all the truth you know than he has to all the medicine in your
He should get only as much as is good for him."' Similarly, the
saddlebags ....
American Medical Association's first code of ethics warned the physician "to avoid
all things which have a tendency to discourage the patient and to depress his
spirits."'2 Over time, however, these paternalistic viewpoints of the physician-patient
relationship were replaced by a modem, patient-oriented approach that emphasized
informed decision making by the patient.3 Now, physicians give care under Justice
Cardozo's view that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his [or her] own body."4 This modem view
forms the backbone of the doctrine of informed consent.5 The doctrine has
developed exceptions arising at common law and in federal and state statutes.6 The
doctrine and its exceptions continue to have a broad impact on both the practice of
medicine and the evolution of society.7

* LL.M., The George Washington University Law School; J.D., South Texas College of Law; M.H.A.,
The Medical College of Virginia; B.A., The College of William and Mary. The author thanks Professors Sara
Rosenbaum of The George Washington University Law School and Sandra J. Carnahan of South Texas College of
Law for their invaluable comments and insight on earlier drafts of this Article. Additional thanks to the fine editorial
board of the New Mexico Law Review for helping deliver this piece into the world.
1. Ben A. Rich, Prognosticationin ClinicalMedicine, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 297,317(2002) (second alteration
in original) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Young Practitioner,in MEDICAL ESSAYS 1842-1882, 370, 388
(Classics Med. Library ed. 1987)).
2. W. John Thomas, Informed Consent, the Placebo Effect, and the Revenge of Thomas Percival, 22 J.
LEGAL MED. 313, 315 (2001) (quoting CODE OF ETHICS (1847) art. 1(4), reprinted in AMERICAN MEDICAL ETHICS
REVOLUTION: How THE AMA's CODE OF ETHICS HAS TRANSFORMED PHYSICIANS' RELATIONSHIPS TO PATIENTS,
PROFESSIONALS, AND SoCIETY 324, 325 (Robert B. Baker et al. eds., 1999)). This first version of the 1847 code of
ethics also "advised against allowing the patient any voice in diagnosis and treatment: '[Physicians should....unite
in tenderness with firmness, and condescension with authority, as to inspire the minds of their patients with
gratitude, respect and confidence]."' Id. (quoting CODE OF ETHICS (1847) art. I(1), supra, at 324) (internal quotation
corrected).
3. See Rich, supra note 1, at 317; James A. Bulen, Jr., Complementary and Alternative Medicine, 24 J.
LEGAL MED. 331, 337-38 (2003).
4. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogatedon other groundsby Bing
v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957), and superseded by statute, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d(1) (McKinney
2002); see also infra Part 11discussing Schloendorff Although the case dates back to 1914, the seeds of the doctrine
put forth in Schloendorffwere sown as early as the 1700s. "[1]t is reasonable that a patient should be told what is
about to be done to him...." Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, 95 Eng. Rep. 860, 862 (K.B. 1767). In Slater, a patient
sued his two physicians for placing his broken leg in an experimental device designed to improve healing. See
Madeleine M. Jester, A History of Informed Consent, RISK REVIEW (1998), http://www.cnahealthpro.com/
amt/consentjhistory.html. The suit was brought not only on the grounds that the physicians were experimenting
on him, but also that they had done so without his informed consent. Id.
The seeds of the informed consent doctrine continued to grow in the late nineteenth century: "To
deliberately inject a poison of known high degree of virulency into a human being, unless you obtain that man's
sanction...is criminal." Ezekiel Emmanuel, Nat'l Insts. of Health, What Makes ClinicalResearch Ethical?2 (2005),
http://bioethics.nih.gov/hsrc/slides/Zeke-EthicalResearch.pdf (quoting William Osler's 1898 response to an oral
presentation by Giuseppe Sanarelli on the discovery of the agent for transmission of yellow fever).
5. See Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between
Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 WiS. L. REV. 413, 414.
6. See generally id.(discussing the exceptions to informed consent).
7. See id. at 427-28.
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Informed consent in the treatment context has a different purpose than in the
research context, requiring a different level of protection and consent for the patient
than for the research subject. Because there is a greater potential for harm in
research, there must be greater protection for a research subject. With varying levels
of protection, exceptions to the doctrine have been carved out to allow for situations
when obtaining consent is impossible or not feasible. Recent advances in medical
technology have brought the requirement of informed consent into stark relief.
There is a rich literature on informed consent, so rather than providing a complete
review, this Article examines the doctrine in the treatment and research contexts
through the use of recent case law and clinical research trials. Part I describes the
importance of informed consent and the different levels of protection necessary in
the contexts of treatment and research. Part II briefly examines informed consent for
treatment. Part m traces the history of informed consent for research and discusses
the important distinction between therapeutic and nontherapeutic research. Part Ill
also evaluates the role of researchers' economic interests as well as that of
institutional review boards. Part IV analyzes exceptions to the informed consent
doctrine, first in the treatment context, then in the research context. Finally, Part V
concludes with a call for a re-evaluation of the informed consent process to squarely
meet the growing sophistication in research methods. Specifically, this Article
argues that the exceptions to informed consent in research should be abolished. With
advances in genomic and genetic medicine, the potential development of additional
exceptions to the doctrine of informed consent creates the risk of the exceptions
swallowing the rule-that all individuals be accorded the opportunity to give their
informed consent for participation in research trials or to receive treatment.
A. An Introduction to Informed Consent
Informed consent stems from the common law tort of battery 8 and requires
that
a caregiver or researcher not minister to or even touch a patient until the patient has
received and agreed to some essential information about the proposed course of
treatment. 9 This requirement imposes an affirmative duty on the caregiver or
researcher.'° The duty cannot be satisfied in one fell swoop-informed consent is
an ongoing process and "not just proforma adherence to checklists and forms."'" It
involves "ensuring.. .that a patient truly understandsthe parameters of a proposed
treatment and agrees to accept treatment."'"
Three basic components comprise a valid informed consent: capacity, disclosure,
and voluntariness. 3 A patient must have the capacity to understand both the

8. E.g., GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 115 (3d ed. 2004).
9. E.g.,id. at 113.
10. E.g., id. at 115.
11. RONALD W. SCOTr, LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOCUMENTING PATIENT CARE 126 (1994).
12. Id.
at 126-27 (emphasis added). This rigid adherence to the ongoing process comes notwithstanding the
fact that a recent study of consents obtained in a cancer trial revealed ninety percent patient satisfaction with the
informed consent process. See Martin H.N. Tattersall, Examining Informed Consent to CancerClinicalTrials, 358
LANCEr 1742 (2001).
13. Edward Etchells, Informed Consent in Surgical Trials, 23 WORLD J. SURGERY 1215, 1215 (1999); see
also Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28
AM. J. L. & MED. 361,364-69 (2002). For a more detailed discussion of the elements of informed consent, see infra
Part I.B. For a discussion of actual comprehension by the patient, an extension of capacity, see infra notes 201-206.
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information presented and its relevance, and be able "to appreciate the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of her decision."'' 4 In turn, the caregiver must disclose
relevant information to the patient in terms that the patient can understand. 5 Finally,
a patient's decision based on that information must be made voluntarily--"without
6 Each of those components must be present for
force, coercion, or manipulation."'
7
valid.'
be
to
consent
patient's
a
Courts use two different standards to evaluate the scope of information that
physicians must disclose for consent to be informed: the physician-oriented standard
and the patient-oriented standard. 8 The physician-oriented standard adopts the
reasonable physician's viewpoint of what information should be disclosed, while the
patient-oriented standard adopts the patient's viewpoint." The patient-oriented
viewpoint has gained acceptance, but the traditional, physician-oriented viewpoint
is still the law in approximately half of the states. 20 However, a physician's duty to
disclose relevant information must not be confused with his duty to follow the
standard of care. 2' The duty to disclose and the duty to follow the standard of care
are separate professional requirements.2 2
Informed consent is required when a patient receives treatment from her
physician and when a researcher conducts a study involving human subjects.23
"Treatment" is defined as "all the steps taken to effect a cure of an injury or disease,
including examination and diagnoses as well as application of remedies. 24
"Research" is defined as an "investigation, including research development, testing
and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge. 25
Two values guide informed consent in both treatment and research: self-

14. See Etchells, supra note 13, at 1215. While Dr. Etchells' article focuses on surgical research trials,
corollaries can easily be made to any context where informed consent is required. His article provides a list of
questions that should be used to assess patient capacity relating to research participation, as well as the types of
information that a patient should be provided regarding clinical trials. Id. at 1216.
15. Id. at 1215.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Bulen, supra note 3, at 332.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 335-38.
21. Id. at 335. The case of Canterburyv. Spence created an objective legal standard by which physicians'
disclosure activities should be judged. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). "Respect for the patient's right of selfdetermination on particular therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which physicians
may or may not impose upon themselves." Id. at 784. This holding effectively removed subjective viewpoints from
the equation because it was neither the patient nor the physician who determined the information to be disclosed;
rather, it was the law that determined which information was to be disclosed.
In this context, the "standard of care" maybe defined as the conduct demanded of a reasonable physician
in a given situation. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1441 (8th ed. 2004).
22. See Bulen, supra note 3, at 335.
23. See generally supra notes 7, 13.
24. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1346 (5th ed. 1979).
25. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2005). "Research" was defined in the Belmont Report as
an activity designed to test an hypothesis, permit conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to
develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge (expressed, for example, in theories,
principles, and statements of relationships). Research is usually described in a formal protocol
that sets forth an objective and a set of procedures designed to reach that objective.
Noah, supranote 13, at 387-88 (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192-93 (Apr. 18, 1979)).
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determination and respect for persons. 2 6 The value of self-determination is
inculcated in the doctrine by recognizing that a patient can only make an informed
decision on her treatment if the physician discloses both the risks and the benefits
of that treatment.27 The value of respect for persons is most at risk in the research
context because the individual might feel pressured to participate in research trials
because she fears reduced care.28
Research studies require a higher standard of review for informed consent
because of the increased risk of harm and lack of corresponding benefit to the
subject by participation in the study.2 9 The research subject requires a more thorough
explanation of the details of the study than if she were simply receiving treatment,
especially the study's potential harmful consequences. Researchers have recently
pointed to an increased blurring of the distinction between the treatment and
research viewpoints, which signals a movement toward a single standard of review
for informed consent.3 °
At times it can be impossible to obtain informed consent from an individual.
Rather than completely bar treatment or research in those situations, several
exceptions to informed consent have been carved out. The most commonly
recognized exceptions are (1) for the provision of care when the patient is
incapacitated, such as in an emergency situation; (2) for therapeutic privilege in the
treatment context; and (3) for patients' voluntary waiver of informed consent.3'
When an exception to informed consent applies, a caregiver or investigator is
permitted to proceed despite a total or partial lack of a patient's informed consent.32

26. See, e.g., Timothy M. Banks, Misusing Informed Consent: A Critique of Limitations on Research
Subjects'Access to Genetic Research Results, 63 SASK. L. REv. 539, 545 (2000).
27. Cf id. at 546.
28. See, e.g., id.; Jay Katz, Human Experimentationand Human Rights, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 34 (1993).
"[P]rospective research subjects may be open to subtle coercion due to a mistaken belief that their care may be
affected by whether they participate in the research." Banks, supra note 26, at 546; see also Rich, supra note 1, at
322 ("The doctrine of informed consent is unequivocally a creature of law."). The doctrine was first recognized in
1947 during the Nuremberg trials and is discussed infra Part Ill.A.1. It was first used by a court in 1957 in Salgo
v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. 1957).
29. See Noah, supra note 13, at 363; Sandra J. Carnahan, PromotingMedical Research Without Sacrificing
PatientAutonomy: Legal and Ethical Issues Raised by the Waiver of Informed Consentfor Emergency Research,
52 OKLA. L. REv. 565, 573 (1999).
30. See Noah, supra note 13, at 363.
It is important to distinguish between biomedical and behavioral research, on the one hand, and
the practice of accepted therapy on the other, in order to know what activities ought to undergo
review for the protection of human subjects of research. The distinction between research and
practice is blurred partly because both often occur together (as in research designed to evaluate
a therapy) and partly because notable departures from standard practice are often called
"experimental" when the terms "experimental"
and "research" are not carefully
designed... When a clinician departs in a significant way from standard or accepted practice, the
innovation does not, in and of itself, constitute research. The fact that a procedure is
"experimental," in the sense of new, untested, or different, does not automatically place it in the
category of research. Radically new procedures of this description should, however, be made the
object of formal research at an early stage in order to determine whether they are safe and
effective.
Id. at 387-88 (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192-93 (Apr. 18, 1979)).
31. See Rich, supra note 1, at 329. For a detailed discussion of the three most commonly recognized
exceptions, as well as an analysis of the "waiver" exception, see infra Part IV.
32. E.g., Meisel, supra note 5, at 433. "The exceptions to the informed consent doctrine are as firmly rooted
in the societal value accorded to health as the informed consent doctrine's dual requirements of disclosure and
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B. The Importance of Informed Consentfor Treatment

Informed consent in treatment is a right engendered by society that developed
throughout the second half of the twentieth century.33 This right pivots on four
primary societal interests: "(1) the preservation of life; (2) the prevention of suicide;
(3) the maintenance of the medical profession's ethical integrity; and (4) the
protection of the interests of third parties. ' 34 These interests place responsibility for
the patient and her treatment on the caregiver. The tension created by maintaining
these values, while still respecting individual autonomy, makes informed consent
crucial to the care patterns of physicians and the individual patient's treatment
options. Through these societal interests, two affirmative duties flow to the
caregivers:3" the duty to disclose all relevant information to the patient36 and the duty
to obtain consent from the patient prior to commencing treatment.37 These two
duties shape the manner of treatment because, by having to disclose risks and obtain
consent, physicians are forced to conform to the patient's subjective view of
acceptable treatment. If a patient chooses to forego an existing available treatment,
the physician must ensure that the patient understands the immediate and potential
consequences to her health but must ultimately respect the patient's decision.
Oliver Wendell Holmes observed that "[tlhere is nothing men will not do...to
recover their health and save their lives., 38 This basic survival instinct is what makes
informed consent important because a tension exists between the desire and the right
of an individual to pursue treatment and the overall interests of society reflected in
the social and economic costs of treatment. With patients often ready to try virtually
anything and everything to save their lives or to improve their health, informed
consent functions as a societal and ethical check on the behavior of patients and their
caregivers.
There are six primary elements and one catch-all provision that most medical
ethicists view as necessary for proper informed consent in the treatment context.39
The caregiver must discuss the following in a manner that the patient can
understand:
(1)A description of the recommendedtreatmentor procedure; (2) [a] description
of the risks and benefits of the recommended procedure, with special emphasis
on risks of death or serious bodily disability; (3) [a] description of the
alternatives,including other treatments or procedures, together with the risks
consent are in the societal value accorded to individualism." Id. However, if informed consent from the patient or
subject is not obtained, and an exception does not apply, then the physician may be liable to the patient on a
negligence theory if the patient is injured. See Bulen, supra note 3, at 331.
33. See Meisel, supra note 5, at 413.
34. Suzanne K. Ketler, Note, The Rebirth of Informed Consent: A CulturalAnalysis of the Informed Consent
Doctrine After Schreiber v. Physicians Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1029, 1039 (2001); Elaine
B. Krasik, Comment, The Role of the Family in Medical Decisionmaking for Incompetent Adult Patients: A
HistoricalPerspective and Case Analysis, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 539, 545 (1987).
35. See Meisel, supra note 5, at 486.
36. Id.; see also Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 844 (Md. 2001) ("A human subject
is entitled to all material information.").
37. E.g., Meisel, supra note 5, at 486.
38.

ANNAS, supra note 8, at 1.

39. id. at 86.
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and benefits of these alternatives; (4) [tlhe likely results of no treatment; (5)
[tihe probability of success, and what the physician means by success; (6) [tjhe
major problems anticipated in recuperation,and the time period during which
the patient will not be able to resume his or her normal activities; and (7) [any
other information generally provided to patients in this situation by other
qualified physicians.i'
By describing the treatment and its alternatives, including the risk of no treatment,
as well as success rates and potential problems, the patient is given a vivid picture
of her situation.
Merely presenting the necessary information to the patient is insufficient to
achieve informed consent. The caregiver must also ensure that each individual
patient understands the information presented. This places a great deal of
responsibility on the caregiver to make a subjective determination as to whether
each patient understands the information. Commentators have suggested that a
significant portion of the population does not have sufficient knowledge to give
informed consent after a physician has presented the necessary information.4 ' For
example, a recent British study analyzed stroke victims' consent processes and
revealed that thirty-nine percent of the patients surveyed did not know that "one in
four" means twenty-five percent.42 The report concluded that "[a] substantial
minority of people in this population.. .could not process simple statistical
information .... If the consenting process is about informing patients so they can
make balanced and reasoned decisions, and the
logic behind those decisions is
43
statistical, many cannot give informed consent.
While digesting statistical information may seem daunting to some, developing
an understanding of health information can be no less complex. In reviewing the
seven elements of informed consent for treatment, it is striking how intrinsic
statistics are to the information. The words "risks," "likely results," and
"probability" require some sort of statistical interpretation. The patient's lack of
statistical understanding, as shown by the British study, puts caregivers in a
precarious position. Caregivers can find themselves on a slippery slope-having to
retreat backwards in the sophistication of the information presented while looking
for a common ground of information that the patient can understand.
Requiring caregivers to prove that patients understand the information presented
to them creates yet another difficulty. For example, if, after walking the patient
through the seven pieces of information listed above, the caregiver asks his patient
if he understands and the patient replies "yes," then what more can society require
of the caregiver to determine the accuracy of the patient's answer? Should the

40. Id.; see also GEORGE J. ANNAs ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION: THE
SUBJEcT'S DILEMMA 30 (1977) (listing five elements that the physician must discuss in lay terms).
41. Cf.Carnahan, supra note 29, at 575 (noting that patients "commonly do not understand" the risks of
medical treatment).
42. Simon J. Ellis et al., Letter to the Editors, Informed Consent Is Flawed, 357 LANcET 149, 150 (2001)
(citing National Institute of Neurological Disordersand Stroke rt-PA Stroke Study Group, Tissue Plasminogen
ActivatorforAcute Ischaemic Stroke, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1581-87 (1995)). "44% did not know that a reduction
of 25% was a reduction of a quarter; and 43% did not know that a reduction of 25% was equivalent to a reduction
of 25 in 100." Id. "Informed consent is the bulwark of ethical conduct....[B]ut it is flawed." Id.
43. Id.
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physician give some sort of quiz to the patient in order to ensure his understanding?
Detractors of this approach quickly point to the deleterious effect these steps have
on the amount of time the caregiver spends actually treating the patient.
By focusing on the questions that they present to patients, physicians can mitigate
patients' lack of understanding and provide understandable information that directly
benefits the patient." Recognizing that "informed consent ...
[is] a process involving
a series of questions and answers," physicians should be cautioned against "data
dumping" on the patient.4 5 Rather, patients should be asked how much information
they wish to be exposed to, whether they prefer family members or friends to be
present during the information exchange, and the type of decision matrix that they
prefer to use.' In order to satisfy the required elements of informed consent in the
treatment context, all of these inquiries should precede the sharing of information
between the physician and the patient.4 7 This process preserves the principle of
autonomy while ensuring that patients give truly informed consent.
C. The Importance of Informed Consentfor Research
As with treatment, obtaining informed consent is crucial to ethical research." The
Code of Federal Regulations clearly states that "no investigator may involve a
human being as a subject in research... unless the investigator has obtained
the...informed consent of the subject or the subject's legally authorized
representative."49 These regulations list eight essential elements of information that
must be provided to the potential research participant for proper informed consent:
(1) a statement that the study involves research, as well as a description of the
research and its purposes; (2) a description of reasonably foreseeable risks; (3)
a description of reasonably expected benefits; (4) disclosure of appropriate
alternatives; (5) a statement about maintenance of confidentiality; (6) for
research involving more than minimal risk, an explanation of possible
consequences if injury occurs; (7) information about how the subject can have
questions answered; and (8) a statement that participation is voluntary ......
44. Joal Hill, Veracity in Medicine, 362 LANCET 1944, 1944 (2003).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id. (discussing cultural sensitivities to informed consent). Hill's article notes that "interpretation and
application [of informed consent] in clinical care are profoundly affected by cultural influences." Id. For example,
"[iln Japan, even proponents of shared greater decision-making note that imposing radical notions of autonomy on
patients, in which they are forced to receive information whether they want it or not, abrogates the principle of
respect for persons and thus autonomy." Id.
48. For a detailed discussion of informed consent in medical research, see infra Part 111.
49. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2005). Further,
[a]n investigator shall seek such consent only under circumstances that provide the prospective
subject or the representative sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to participate and
that minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence. The information that is given to the
subject or the representative shall be in language understandable to the subject or the
representative. No informed consent, whether oral or written, may include any exculpatory
language through which the subject or the representative is made to waive or appear to waive
any of the subject's legal rights, or releases or appears to release the investigator, the sponsor,
the institution or its agents from liability for negligence.
Id.
50. Lisa S. Parker, Ethical Issues in Bipolar DisordersPedigree Research: Privacy Concerns, Informed
Consent, and Groundsfor Waiver, 4 BIPOLAR DisoRDERs 1, 2-3 (2002) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1)-(8)).
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These elements are different from those required in the treatment context.
The elements of informed consent for research provide additional protection to
the research subject. In contrast to the treatment context, the research participant is
not provided with information on the effect of non-participation in the study, the
probability of success of the study, or the recuperation period involved with
participating in the study. Instead, the subject is advised on the confidentiality
aspects of participation and the consequences to her should injury occur. 51 Here the
distinction between informed consent in the treatment and research contexts is
highlighted. The treatment context is focused on the patient's health, while in the
research context the patient's well-being becomes secondary to the improvement of
society by the creation of generalized knowledge. A separate crucial distinction
arises between therapeutic and nontherapeutic research. While therapeutic research
focuses on an individual's condition, nontherapeutic research focuses on benefiting
the public as a whole.52 The benefit of therapeutic research on the individual
distinguishes it from the unknowns of nontherapeutic research-primarily whether
the research subject suffers from the condition that the study is designed to
address.53
As with treatment, the informed consent process for research has been
characterized as an "elaborate ritual" that does not result in true informed consent
because of a lack of understanding regarding the risks and benefits of participation. 4
This is true despite the fact that the physician may have adhered assiduously to the
informed consent process. Instead, the informed consent process serves only to
insulate the researcher from subsequent malpractice claims and fails to provide the
subject with the prospective benefit intended by the doctrine.55 Detractors of the
doctrine point to its lack of practical effect and its irrelevance in the research
context.56 If patients do not give true informed consent, and only malpractice claims
are impacted, then the process fails.57

When appropriate, the participant should also be provided information on:
(1) unforeseeable risks; (2) circumstances under which the subject's participation will be
terminated; (3) additional costs that the subject may incur; (4) the consequences of a subject's
decision to withdraw; (5) the dissemination of findings developed during the study that relate
to a subject's willingness to continue; and (6) the approximate number of total subjects. The
consent must be documented in writing and signed by the subject or his legally authorized
representative.
Id. at 3 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(1)-(6)).
51. Compare supra note 40 and accompanying text with supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
52. For a discussion of the differences between these two types of research, see infra Part M.B.
53. See infra Part III.B.
54. Carnahan, supra note 29, at 575.
55. See id.
56. See, e.g., Len Doyal, Informed Consent in Medical Research: Journals Should Not Publish Research
to Which Patients Have Not Given Fully Informed Consent-With Three Exceptions, 314 BRrISH MED. J. 1107

(1997); Angus J. Dawson, Methodological Reasons for Not Gaining PriorInformed Consent Are Sometimes
Justified, 329 BRmISH MED. J. 87 (2004).
57. Individual researchers are not the only ones subject to the requirements of the doctrine. See, e.g., Khabir
Ahmad, Drug Company Sued over Research Trial in Nigeria, 358 LANCEr 815 (2001). Pfizer, a major
pharmaceutical company, was sued by a group of Nigerian families for failing to obtain the consent of children or
their parents before giving them a new, untested drug for bacterial meningitis. id. The article states that "inadequate
attention had been paid to the moral duties incumbent on those doing research in poor nations." Id. Given this
situation, "more and more [Pfizer] type cases could be expected to be brought." Id.
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While the practical reality of informed consent for research is problematic, the
perceptions of the research subjects themselves tell a different story. A recent study
of 207 cancer patients enrolled in clinical trials at several major healthcare facilities
revealed that ninety percent were satisfied with the informed consent process and
most considered themselves to be well informed. 8 Subsequent questioning,
however, revealed basic misperceptions regarding the treatment given in the trial.59
"Many did not realise that the [research protocol] was not proven to be the best for
their cancer, that the study used non-standard treatments or procedures, that
participation might carry incremental risk, or that they might not receive direct
medical benefit from participation. ' These are, of course, some of the essential
elements comprising informed consent.6'
The perceptions of the researchers also tell a different story. Perhaps of most
consequence in this particular study was the fact that only twenty-eight of sixty-one
providers (forty-six percent) recognized that the main reason for clinical trials is to
benefitfuture patients. 62 The question must then be asked: what do the researchers
believe is actually the main reason for clinical trials?
Similarly, a review of thirty-five neonatal randomized controlled trials revealed
that ninety-six percent of the trials reported one hundred percent informed consent.6 3
This "raise[s] the question as to whether such consent is truly informed-if parents
were fully informed of their options and freely able to choose not to take part, at
least some would surely choose not to."' The fact that so few chose not to take part
in the controlled trial suggests flaws in the process of obtaining true informed
consent.65
What should be done if, as suggested by the studies discussed above, informed
consent is flawed or there is not actual consent? In the research arena, commentators
have put forth three options: disallow the research, abolish the consent requirement
for the research, or accept the imperfections of informed consent while striving to
obtain the best consent under the circumstances.' One other option, not found in the
above-mentioned literature, would simply be to continue to create new exceptions
to the doctrine as necessary to fit the current situation. While this option, taken to

58. Steven Joffe et al., Quality of Informed Consent in Cancer Clinical Trials:A Cross-SectionalSurvey,
358 LANCET 1772, 1774 (2001). The facilities were the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, Brigham and Women's
Hospital, and Massachusetts General Hospital. Id. at 1773.
59. Id. at 1774.
60. Id.
61. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
62. Joffe et al., supra note 58, at 1775. The article acknowledges the difficult situation facing the researchers.
"Although our results suggest the need for improvements in informed consent to research, they also point to its
complexity in the setting of cancer clinical trials." Id. at 1776.
63. Harry Campbell, Letter to the Editors, Informed Consent in NeonatalRandomised Trials, 357 LANCEr
1445 (2001). Research involving children is covered by a separate set of rules than research involving adults. See
45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401-.409 (2005).
64. Campbell, supra note 63, at 1445. "One potentially useful approach is to audiotape the obtaining of
informed consent and to give the parents [of the participating children] a copy." T.H.H.G. Koh et al., Letter to the
Editors, Informed Consent in Neonatal Randomised Trials, 357 LANCET 1445 (2001).
65. See Campbell, supra note 63, at 1445. As a means of emphasizing the seriousness of informed consent,
the author recommends that consent rates be expressly stated in each published trial. Id.
66. See Su A. Mason et al., Obtaining Informed Consent to Neonatal Randomised Controlled Trials:
Interviews with Parentsand Cliniciansin the Euricon Study, 356 LANCET 2045, 2050 (2000).
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its extreme, will inevitably lead to the exceptions swallowing the rule, it is still a
viable option for current practice.
The researchers who engaged in the recent neonatal study preferred the third
option of moving forward with the information available.67 Seventy percent of the
cases included some defect in at least one of the elements of informed consent. 68 The
researchers listed several strategies for achieving a higher rate of informed consent.
Primary among them was to provide information in oral and written formats
simultaneously, as well as to inform the patient that the study had been reviewed and
approved by research ethics committees. 69 These tactics would help normalize the
highly variable results of the published studies-where researchers obtain either no
informed consent or imperfect informed consent-while still meeting the technical
requirements of the doctrine. Currently, however, informed consent in research is
measured by the degree to which the elements described above are met, not the level
of the subjects' understanding. If the elements are met, then informed consent
theoretically exists. Thus, there will always be some element of doubt as to whether
actual informed consent is obtained.
II. INFORMED CONSENT IN THE TREATMENT CONTEXT
The goal of informed consent prior to treatment has always been the same-to
focus on the health of the individual patient. One of the primary issues in dealing
with informed consent is that the scope of the patient's consent may be limited. This
was addressed in the early case of Schloendorff v. New York.70 In Schloendorff, the
patient agreed to undergo an examination while she was unconscious. 71 The purpose
of the examination was to diagnose a lump suspected of being a tumor.72 While the
patient was anesthetized, however, the surgeon removed the tumor. 73 The patient
subsequently suffered gangrene and other illnesses as a result of the procedure.74
The patient contended that she had not authorized the removal of the growth but
rather that she had only consented to an examination and diagnosis.75 She then sued
her physician on a battery theory.76 The New York Court of Appeals held that the
physician had battered the patient and should have informed her of the risks and
alternatives involved with the treatment prior to taking any action other than what
was authorized.77

67. Id.
68. See id. Specifically, "59 of the 200 parents [of the neonates] [(30%)] had given valid consent or refusal
but the remainder had problems in one or more of the component areas (42 for competence, 43 for information, 44
for understanding, and 21 for voluntariness)." Id. at 2045.
69. Id. at 2050. For a detailed discussion of research ethics committees or institutional review boards, see
infra Part M.D.
70. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). See also Perna v. Perozzi, 457 A.2d 431 (N.J. 1983) (holding that the surgeon

who signs
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

the consent form must also be the one to perform the surgery or else there is a battery).
Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 93-94.
Id. at 94.
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Disclosure of the potential for adverse effects to the patient is a primary element
of informed consent. 78 Natanson v. Kline79 was one of the first cases to require
disclosure. In Natanson, the plaintiff visited a radiation oncologist for follow-up
treatment to a mastectomy. 8) The treating physician ordered the administration of
radiation to the affected area. 8' The ensuing treatment destroyed skin, muscle, and
bone surrounding the plaintiff's chest.8 2 The plaintiff sued on the basis that she had
not been informed of the potential for the adverse effect.83 The court held that the
treating physician "was obligated to make a reasonable disclosure to the [patient] of
the nature and probable consequences of the suggested.. .treatment, and he was also
obligated to make a reasonable disclosure of the dangers within his knowledge
which were.. .possible in.. .the treatment." ' Informed consent from the patient was
not possible because the physician failed to make a reasonable disclosure. Perhaps
realizing that they were only requiring disclosure of what most individuals would
deem common sense, the court commented that this type of disclosure should not
pose an "insurmountable obstacle[]" to the physician. 85
The concept of disclosure of adverse effects to the patient was further developed
in the famous case of Canterbury v. Spence. 86 The court in that case determined
which risks must be disclosed to the patient and explicitly stated that a physician
owed a duty to her patient.8 7 In Canterbury, a nineteen-year-old boy underwent
surgery for a herniated (or ruptured) disc.88 Following the surgery, he fell in his
hospital room and was subsequently paralyzed from the waist down.89 He filed suit
alleging that his physician had failed to disclose the risk of paralysis to him prior to
performing the surgical procedure. 90 The circuit court first found that the physician
had a duty to adequately disclose the risks of the procedure to the patient.9' Second,
the court stated that the scope of the required disclosure must include risks that the
patient views as material.92 Specifically, "[a] risk is... material when a reasonable
person, in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position,
would be likely to attach significance to the risk...in deciding whether or not to
forego the proposed therapy." 93 Under this test, truly remote risks need not be

78. See Meisel, supra note 5, at 420.
79. 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960).
80. Id. at 1095.
81. Id. at 1096.
82. Id. at 1097.
83. Id. at 1099.
84. Id. at 1106.
85. Id. at 1107.
86. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
87. Id. at 786-88.
88. Id. at 776.
89. Id. at 777.
90. Id. at 778.
91. Id. at783.
92. Id. at 786-88. "[Tlhe issue on nondisclosure must be approached from the viewpoint of the
reasonableness of the physician's divulgence in terms of what he knows or should know to be the patient's
informational needs." Id. at 787.
93. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed Consent to
Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 628, 640 (1970)).
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disclosed.9' The Canterburycourt firmly adopted the patient-oriented viewpoint for
informed consent because of the requirement that the physician disclose risks that
the patient views as material.95
The physician must also disclose the risks of the patient's abstention from certain
commonplace diagnostic tests. 96 In Tua
Truman v. Thomas, a patient visited her
physician complaining of a recurring urinary tract infection.97 During the
examination and subsequent treatment, the physician advised the patient to submit
to a pap smear. 98 The patient did not do so and was later diagnosed with cervical
cancer. 99 Expert testimony presented at trial indicated that, had she undergone the
pap smear during the five-year period that she was under the care of the physician,
the cervical tumor could have been discovered and removed. °° The patient's
children sued on the grounds that her physician failed to inform her of the risks
associated with not having the pap smear performed.' ' The physician defended
himself on the grounds that he could not force her to undergo the procedure, stating,
"I think [the pap smear] is a widely known and generally accepted manner of
treatment and I think the patient has a high degree of responsibility. We are not
enforcers, we are advisors."'' 0 2 The court disagreed, holding that the physician had
a duty to disclose the risks associated with not having the pap smear because that
information was material to her treatment. 10 3 Therefore, Truman increased the
physician's burden of obtaining informed consent by requiring physicians to
disclose information that they would normally consider common knowledge.
This line of cases shaped the current state of informed consent in the treatment
context. The doctrine focuses on the individual health of the patient. A caregiver has
an affirmative duty to disclose the material risks and benefits of a diagnostic
procedure or treatment to a patient prior to commencing that care, and to disclose
the risks of foregoing treatment. The definition of a material risk is defined from the
patient's viewpoint, not the physician's. Failure to disclose the risks breaches the
physician's duty and can result in a viable negligence claim against the physician
if the patient is injured.

94. BARRY R. FuRRow ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 367 (5th ed. 2004).
95. The viewpoint was subsequently adopted across the country. See, e.g., Korman v. Mallin, 858 P.2d 1145
(Alaska 1993); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E. 2d 371 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000);
Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489 (Haw. 1995); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014 (Md. 1977); Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d
504 (N.J. 1988).
96. See Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 902 (Cal. 1980).
97. Id. at 904.
98. Id. The physician testified that he advised the patient to submit to a pap smear, but did not explain the
risks of failing to do so. Id. The physician, however, was unable to produce records of his recommendation or to
recount a specific conversation with the patient. Id.
99. Id.

100. Id.
10 1. Id. at 904-05.
102. Id. at904.
103. Id. at 907.
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IlI. INFORMED CONSENT IN THE RESEARCH CONTEXT
A. The History of the Doctrine
Informed consent in the research context focuses on the overall benefit of the
research study to society, not on the individual health of the research subject."
Because of this focus on the improvement of societal health, research participants
need additional protections against the potential for injury caused by the study.
These protections evolved during the twentieth century as a result of abuse to
individual research participants.
1. The Nuremberg Code
Following World War II, Nazi physicians stood trial at Nuremberg for crimes
against humanity. 10 5 During the War, these physicians conducted unauthorized
experiments on prisoners of war and civilians of non-German heritage.'I6 As a result
of the egregious nature of these experiments, the Military Tribunals published the
Nuremberg Code in 1946.'07 The Code was the "first major curb on research in any
nation"' 1 8 and signaled the beginning of the era of informed consent for research by
summarizing the legal requirements for human experimentation.0
The Nuremberg Code required that the consent of an experimental subject have
four characteristics-it must be voluntary, competent, informed, and understood."0
The Code's first principle was that "[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is
absolutely essential.""' By obtaining voluntary informed consent, the individual's
autonomy is respected, enabling the research to continue.12 These elements are
similar to the elements required for informed consent in the treatment context. 3 The
Code did not permit surrogate consent, which is consent given by an authorized
representative or guardian of the subject when the subject is incapacitated." 4
Instead, consent had to be sought solely from the subject." 5
In addition to describing the required character of the subject's consent, the Code
detailed nine principles to be satisfied prior to enrolling the subject in a study.1 6 All

104. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
105. See 2 THE NUREMBERG CODE, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No.10, at 181-82 (1949), reprintedin ROBERTJ. LEVINE, ETHICS AND
REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 425-26 (2d ed. 1988), available at http://www.copemicusgroup.com/
irbForms/NurembergCode.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2006) [hereinafter TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS]. For a succinct

summary of the proceedings themselves, see Benjamin B. Ferencz, Nurnberg TrialProcedureand the Rights of the
Accused, 39 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 144 (1948) (title spelled as in the original).
106. See TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supranote 105, at 425.
107. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 835 (Md. 2001). The Military Tribunals were
formed to hear the cases of accused Nazi war criminals.
108. RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L.BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 153 (1986).
109. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 835.
110. See ANNAS ET AL., supra note 40, at 7.
111. TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 105, at 181.
112. See Carnahan,supra note 29, at 570.
113. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
114. TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 105, at 182.
115. Id.
116. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 835-36 (Md. 2001) (quoting George J. Annas,
Mengele's Birthmark:The Nuremberg Code in UnitedStates Courts,7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 17,19-21
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of these principles are centered on protecting the human subject. 17 The Code,
however, did not delineate the procedures to be used to obtain informed consent." 8
That was left to the researchers themselves.
The Nuremberg Code resulted from a legal, rather than scientific, approach to the
problems of informed consent." 9 Because of this legal focus, duties such as
nonmaleficence and respect for a subject's autonomy were imposed upon the
researchers. 20 While the Code has never been directly employed as the basis for an
award of damages to an experimental subject in the United States, 12' neither has it
been disavowed by a court in the United States.' Despite this lack of direct
application in the United States, the Code served as the basis for other resolutions
that refined the requirements of informed consent for subject-based research.
2. The Declaration of Helsinki
Written by the World Medical Association, the Declaration of Helsinki created
a code of ethics and standardized guidelines for investigative researchers.'23
Originally published in 1964, it was revised seven times between 1975 and 2004.24
The Declaration became known as the first attempt at a sort of self-governance by
researchers through the development of an ethical code.125 The document referenced
consent throughout and advised that informed consent be obtained in writing from
the research subject before commencing the study. 26 It also stated that research

(1991)). The nine additional principles are (1) the experiment should be useful and necessary, (2) human
experiments should be based on previous experiments with animals, (3) physical and mental suffering should be
avoided, (4) death and disability should not be expected outcomes of an experiment, (5) the degree of risk taken
should not exceed the humanitarian importance of solving the problem, (6) human subjects should be protected
against even remote possibilities of harm, (7) only qualified scientists should conduct medical research, (8) human
subjects should be free to end an experiment at any time, and (9) the scientist in charge must be prepared to end an
experiment at any stage. See TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALs, supra note 105, at 181-82.
117. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 835.
118. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 108, at 155.
119. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 835.
120. See id.
121. Id. (quoting Annas, supra note 116, at 19-21).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 849-50.
124. See WORLD MED. ASS'N, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: EThICAL PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH
INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECrS (2004), http://www.wma.net/e/policy/pdf/17c.pdf [hereinafter DECLARATION OF
HELSINKI].
125. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 850.
126. See DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, supra note 124. The specific provision reads:
In any research on human beings, each potential subject must be adequately informed of the
aims, methods, sources of funding, any possible conflicts of interest, institutional affiliations of
the researcher, the anticipated benefits and potential risks of the study and the discomfort it may
entail. The subject should be informed of the right to abstain from participation in the study or
to withdraw consent to participate at any time without reprisal. After ensuring that the subject
has understood the information, the physician should then obtain the subject's freely-given
informed consent, preferably in writing. If the consent cannot be obtained in writing, the nonwritten consent must be formally documented and witnessed.
Id.
22 (emphasis added). The 2000 revision added the requirement of obtaining a witness to the non-written
consent. See Heidi P. Forster et al., The 2000 Revision of the Declarationof Helsinki: A Step Forward or More
Confusion?, 358 LANCET 1449, 1451 (2001).
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should be discontinued if it is determined that the risks of the research outweigh the
potential benefits.127
Under the Declaration, the researchers have a duty to monitor the harmfulness of
the research, while the research subject does not.' 28 This duty cannot be abrogated
by consent of the patient.129 This duty is also consistent with the Nuremberg Code
because it prevents researchers from immunizing themselves from their duty of care
by obtaining consent. 3 ° The Declaration, however, differed dramatically from the
allowing for surrogate consent to be given when the subject
Nuremberg Code by
31
was incapacitated.'

The most recent revision to the Declaration of Helsinki significantly expanded its
breadth. First, there was an expansion of the definition of "vulnerable populations"
-i.e., populations that require additional safeguards because of an inability to
provide full informed consent. 32 The definition now encompasses virtually every
type of subject-"from patients with an illness, to those who cannot give consent,
to healthy volunteers ....
[T]he category of vulnerability [is now so broad] that it
eliminates this category as a special protection; if everyone is vulnerable, no one is
entitled to special protection."'' 33 This expansion has led to the effective nullification
of special protection for the vulnerable populations. Second, the Declaration is now
"a statement of ethical principles" instead of a series of "recommendations."' 134
35
Finally, the Declaration claims supremacy over all other laws and regulations. 1
The Declaration states that "every patient"-including those of a control group,
if any-"should be assured of access to the best proven prophylactic, diagnostic and
therapeutic methods identified by the study."' 136 This requirement has had a
sweeping effect on placebo-controlled trials where there are already-accepted
effective methods of treatment.' 37 Essentially, the Declaration forbids researchers
from using placebos where there is an existing, proven medical modality for
treatment, even if the patient is informed of the existing treatment, declines it, and
consents to the trial.' 38 The 2000 Declaration contains "no exception for trials done
in the specific population of patients who would subsequently benefit from a
successful outcome of the research, even when there is adequate patient consent and
of any irreversible harm or other ethically unacceptable
careful avoidance
39
consequences."

127. DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, supranote 124, 1 17.
128. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 850.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Compare DECLARATIONOFHELSINKI, supranote 124,1 26, with TRIALSOFWAR CRIMINALS, supranote
105, at 181-82.
132. See Forster et al., supra note 126, at 1451.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1449.
135. Id. at 1452. The Declaration states that "no national ethical, legal, or regulatory requirement should be

allowed to reduce or eliminate any of the protections for human subjects set forth in this declaration." DECLARATION
OF HELSINKI, supra note 124,

9.

136. See DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, supra note 124, 1 29.
137. See John A. Lewis et al., Placebo-ControlledTrials and the DeclarationofHelsinki, 359 LANCET 1337

(2002).
138. See id.
139. Id.
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Many researchers believe, contrary to the Declaration, that placebo use is still
acceptable when it poses no additional risk to the patient." 4 Essentially, this is the
position of the Food and Drug Administration, which values the double-blind
placebo controlled trial as the "gold standard" among research protocols. 4 ' A
double-blind study eliminates bias and provides scientific certainty by informing
neither the researcher nor the subject of which treatments are inactive and which are
active. 4 2 Others believe that the Declaration should allow for the use of placebos
even when treatments are available, so long as there is a predictable positive effect
to the placebo.'43
The Declaration has its detractors.'4 It has been criticized for a lack of clarity and
"its assertion of supremacy over other guidance and laws."'4 5 The Declaration
created a problem for researchers-they must determine if their research clears two
hurdles: the Declaration itself and the requirements of state and federal law. 46 The
assumption that researchers will follow the state or federal law when the law does
not coincide with the Declaration creates a mixed result by which the Declaration
will either be disregarded entirely in favor of the laws of the jurisdiction or there
will be uneven application of the Declaration's provisions. 47 This problem is
compounded by the Declaration's failure to detail a procedure for addressing
ambiguities in its language
and its failure to address how to handle potential
4
violations of its rules. 1
3. The Beecher Article
Two years after the initial publication of the Declaration of Helsinki, Harvard
medical school researcher Henry Beecher published a study documenting twentytwo cases of unethical research conducted on human subjects. 49 Beecher's article
became enormously influential in the continued evolution of attitudes toward human
experimentation.150 The research that Beecher reviewed was not only harmful to the
subjects themselves but had also been subsequently published in prominent medical
journals.' Through a case-by-case analysis, he demonstrated that the principles of
Nuremburg and Helsinki were not yet woven into either the fabric of the medical

140. See id.
141. See Carnahan, supra note 29, at 577.
142. See id. at 578.
143. Thomas, supra note 2, at 340. Espousing the contrary view, albeit in irreverent form, is the statement
"I'm addicted to placebos. I could quit, but it wouldn't matter."' Id. at 313 n. 1 (quoting Don Mayhew, Wright on
Targetfrom Off Center, FRESNO BEE, May 8, 1998, at B5 (quoting Steven Wright)).
144. See Forster et al, supra note 126, at 1452.
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See id. The article notes that the Food and Drug Administration has refused to incorporate the current
version of the Declaration into its rules regarding studies in foreign countries. Id.
148. See id.
149. See Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and ClinicalResearch, 274 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1354 (1966). The article
begins, "Human experimentation.. .has created some difficult problems with the increasing employment of patients
as experimental subjects when it must be apparent that they would not have been available if they had been truly
aware of the uses that would be made of them." Id. at 1354.
150. David J. Rothman, Ethics and Human Experimentation, 317 Nw ENG. J. MED. 1195 (1987).
151. See Carnahan, supra note 29, at 571.
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establishment or in the media.'5 2 Beecher noted the difficulty involved in obtaining
informed consent but insisted that "it [was] absolutely essential to strive for it."' 53
And if informed consent is not obtained, a bad situation is quickly
compounded if
54
that unethical research is subsequently published in a journal.'
55
Beecher also noted the disparity in position between physicians and patients.'
"If suitably approached, patients will accede, on the basis of trust, to about any
request their physician may make.. .but the usual patient will never agree to
jeopardize seriously his health or his life for the sake of 'science."",156 By openly
acknowledging the physician or researcher's power over her patients, Beecher
reinforced the practical necessity for informed consent. The physician's duty to
disclose the risks of research arose from this influence that physicians have over
their patients in determining a care plan.
4. The Belmont Report
In 1974, the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical Research and Behavioral Research was established in response to
Congress's request for direction on the differences between medical treatment and
human subject research.' 57 The Commission was tasked with identifying the ethical
principles implicated when using human subjects. 58 In this task, the Commission
paid particular attention to the requirements for informed consent of vulnerable
populations in research settings.' 59 The Commission's work was published as the
Belmont Report in 1979.'60
The Belmont Report established three basic ethical principles to apply during
research involving humans: respect for persons, beneficence, and justice.' 6' Of most

relevance to this Article is the principle of respect for persons. 162 This principle is
based on the belief that individuals are autonomous-they are "capable of
deliberation about personal goals and of acting under the direction of such

152. See Beecher, supra note 149, at 1356-59. Beecher described the experiments but did not clearly
demonstrate how they violated the principles of Nuremberg and Helsinki.
153. Id. at 1360. "The statement that consent has been obtained has little meaning unless the subject or his
guardian is capable of understanding what is to be undertaken and unless all hazards are made clear." Id.
154. See id.; see also Franklin G. Miller & Donald L Rosenstein, Reporting ofEthical Issues in Publications
of Medical Research, 360 LANCET 1326, 1326 (2002) (recommending that "editors of medical journals require
authors to discuss ethical issues in reports of clinical research" and noting that "in 1975 the revised Declaration of
Helsinki favoured prohibition of publication of unethical research").
155. See Beecher, supra note 149, at 1355.

156. See id.
157. See Camahan, supra note 29, at 571; Noah, supra note 13, at 387.
158. Establishment of Commission to Protect Research Subjects, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 349 (1974).
159. Id.
160.

NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL

RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS OFRESEARCH, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (Apr. 18, 1979), availableathttp:/Iwww.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects
/guidance/belmont.htm.
161. Id.
162. The other two principles are of no less importance. The principle of beneficence manifests itself by
requiring that an appropriate risk/benefit assessment be performed before research starts. See id. The principle of
justice requires appropriate subject selection-the population of individuals least likely to benefit from the research
should not be over-represented in the study population. See id.
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deliberation."' 163 Individuals with diminished autonomy qualify as vulnerable
subjects and are entitled to special protections."6
The Report described informed consent as having three components: disclosure
of specific items of information, comprehension by the subject of the information
provided, and voluntary agreement to participate in the research on the part of the
subject. 65 If all three components are satisfied, then informed consent exists and the
research may proceed.' 66 Similar to the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of
Helsinki, however, the Belmont Report does not state exactly how these three
components should be satisfied. 67 Nevertheless, the Report continues to be a
guiding factor in applying the law of informed consent.
5. The Code of Federal Regulations
Federal regulations regarding informed consent are a synthesis of two separate
sets of guidelines-one issued by the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) and the other by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).'68 Prior to the
synthesis, the parallel application of the guidelines led to confusion and frustration
amongst the research community.' 69 HHS regulations applied to any research that
was sponsored, regulated, or conducted by a federal department or agency. 70 The
"intended to support the application for
FDA regulations applied to any research
7
FDA approval of a drug or device."' '
Because of the difficulty in simultaneously complying with both sets of
guidelines, researchers sought to fulfill their ethical responsibilities through
"deferred consent" as an alternative consent mechanism. 72 This doctrine allowed
research to commence even if the subject was unable to consent. Under deferred
consent, an opportunity to consent must be given to the patient or her representative
at a later date. 173 One problem with deferred consent was that it placed subjects at
the risk of immediate harm without having the opportunity to consent. The practice
of deferred consent was halted in 1993 when the Office for Protection from
Research Risks, an arm of HHS, stated that deferred consent was not a satisfactory
alternative to informed consent and would not satisfy HHS regulations. 171
Recognizing the difficult position that the competing regulations created for
researchers, the HHS and FDA rules were synthesized and published in the Code of
Federal Regulations in 1996. 7 Popularly known as the "Common Rule," the new

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. Brian T. Bateman et al., Conducting Stroke Research with an Exception from the Requirement for
Informed Consent, 34 STROKE 1317, 1318 (2003).
169. Id.
170. Id.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1319.
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regulations addressed informed consent in detail. 176 They provided for all of the
general principles espoused in the Belmont Report.17 Under the Common Rule,
consent must be obtained from the subject or a representative after the subject has
had time to ponder the decision."7 The subject must understand the language used
in obtaining consent, and the language must not include provisions that waive the
Rule also includes
subject's rights or the researcher's liability.' The Common
80
exceptions to the general requirement of informed consent.
B. The DistinctionBetween Therapeutic and NontherapeuticResearch
The distinction between therapeutic and nontherapeutic research lies in the
intended benefit to the subject. While the distinction between therapeutic and
nontherapeutic research is straightforward, it is particularly crucial when vulnerable
populations are involved. 18' For example, guardians of incompetent persons cannot
consent to nontherapeutic research, but guardians
can consent to an individual's
82
participation in certain therapeutic research.
The purpose of therapeutic research is to "directly help or aid a patient who is
suffering from a health condition the objectives of the research are designed to
address."1 83 This type of research involves treatments that may improve the subject's
condition, thus benefiting the individual subject, but have not yet been proven to
work. Examples of therapeutic research include "clinical drug trials and the use of
experimental medical devices.' 84
Conversely, the additional protections granted to an individual by virtue of status
as a research subject are magnified in nontherapeutic research studies.
"Nontherapeutic research generally utilizes subjects who are not known to have the

176. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2006); Robert Steinbrook, Improving Protectionfor ResearchSubjects, 346 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1425, 1425 (2002).
177. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.20.
[N]o investigator may involve a human being as a subject in research covered by these
regulations unless the investigator has obtained the legally effective informed consent of the
subject or the subject's legally authorized representative. An investigator shall seek such consent
only under circumstances that provide the prospective subject or the representative sufficient
opportunity to consider whether or not to participate and that minimize the possibility of
coercion or undue influence. The information that is given to the subject or the representative
shall be in language understandable to the subject or the representative. No informed consent,
whether oral or written, may include any exculpatory language through which the subject or the
representative is made to waive or appear to waive any of the subject's legal rights, or releases
or appears to release the investigator, the sponsor, the institution, or its agents from liability for
negligence.
Id.
178. id.
179. Id.
180. See infra Part IV (discussing the exceptions to informed consent that appear in the Code at 21 C.F.R.
§§ 50.23-24 (2006)).
181. Cf Margaret A. Sommerville, Therapeutic and Non-Therapeutic Medical Procedures-WhatAre the
Distinctions?,2 HEALTH L. CAN. 85, 86 (198 1) (describing therapeutic and nontherapeutic research and discussing
the implications for incompetent persons).
182. Id.
183. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 811 n.2 (Md. 2001).
184. Beth Newbury Whitstone, Medical Decision Making: Informed Consent in Pediatric and Pediatric
Research (2004), http://tchin.org/resourceroom/c_art.18.htm; see also Kevin O'Rourke, Informed Consent:
Therapeutic andNontherapeutic Trials (1994), http:lwww.op.org/domcentrallstudy/kor/94051509.htm.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

condition the objectives of the research are designed to address, and/or is not
designed to directly benefit the subjects utilized in the research, but, rather, is
designed to achieve beneficial results for the public.... ,I85 The research does not
normally benefit the research subject directly but is performed to provide others with
information for future treatments. 186 Therefore, because of the focus on societal
interests, it is essential that an individual subject be informed of the 1study's
lack of
87
process.
consent
informed
the
during
benefit
therapeutic
individual,
Nontherapeutic research poses a difficult problem for experimentation and
informed consent.188 The past experiences of Auschwitz 189 and Tuskegee,'90 to name
but two, have perhaps labeled nontherapeutic research as an inhumane, unnecessary
evil. 9' The most notorious recent example of nontherapeutic research spiraling out
of control occurred in Grimes v. Kennedy KriegerInstititue, Inc., where otherwise
healthy children were exposed to varying levels of lead dust simply to determine if
partial lead abatement methods had been successful. 9 2 The children, being legally
incompetent and thus vulnerable, were enrolled in the study by their parents. 193 The
parents signed informed consent forms but had not been told of the risks resulting
from exposure to the dust.194 In an opinion that was heavily critical of the
institutional review board (IRB) and the researchers, the court held that parents can
never consent to nontherapeutic research on their children. 95 While this holding has

185. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 811 n.2.
186. Whitstone, supra note 184.
187. See O'Rourke, supra note 184.
188. See LSU L. Ctr., Maryland Court Imposes Judicial Review on Non-Therapeutic Research on Children,
http://biotech.law. lsu.edu/cases/research/grimesvKKI-brief.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
189. Auschwitz was but one of many Nazi concentration camps operated during World War II. U.S.
Holocaust Mem'l Museum, Nazi Camps, in HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.
php?lang=en&Moduleld=10005144 (last visited Oct. 13, 2006).
190. The Tuskegee Syphilis Study involved hundreds of poor African-American men infected with the
disease. Despite the emergence of penicillin as an effective antidote to the condition, the drug was withheld from
the research subjects in order to study the effects of the disease in its advanced state on humans. See BARRY R.
FuRROw ET AL., BiOETHICs: HEALTH CARE LAw AND ETHICS 420 (4th ed. 2001).
191. See id.
192. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 812 (Md. 2001). The standing of
nontherapeutic research in the community is not helped by differences of opinion over its definition. For example,
cancer drug trials are non-therapeutic in that there is no evidence that the drugs are effective
against the cancer and many prove not to be. This is clearly non-therapeutic research, but it is
also clearly not what [Grimes] is concerned with, and it would not be surprising to see an
opinion defending the right of the parents of terminally ill children to try anything that might
have any benefit, as long as they were not lied to. At the same time, [the Grimes] court would
probably not permit children who were terminally ill with cancer to be subjects in a phase I HIV
trial which included the chance of getting HIV.
LSU L Ctr., supra note 188.
193. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 843-44 (describing consent forms signed by the parents). It is also important
to avoid the phenomenon of "therapeutic misconception," which seems to view all nontherapeutic research subjects
as being particularly vulnerable. As one author noted, "Special care is needed in ensuring that there is apparent
understanding of.. .information because patients tend to identify physicians with therapy and find it hard to believe
that a physician would carry out a non-therapeutic procedure on them, even when they are expressly informed of
the fact." Sommerville, supra note 181, at 87.
194. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 813.
195. Id. at 855. The Maryland appellate court ultimately stated that
[w]hen it comes to children involved in nontherapeutic research, with the potential for health
risks to the subject children.. .we will not defer to science to be the sole determinant of the
ethicality or legality of such experiments.... []n nontherapeutic research using children, we hold
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not been extended to all vulnerable populations, after Grimes it is difficult to
imagine a set of circumstances in which a vulnerable or incompetent individual's
guardian could consent to nontherapeutic research involving the individual.
C. The Effect of the Doctrine on Research Methodology
Informed consent in the research context raises several problems. Chief among
them are ensuring subject comprehension, mitigating selection bias, and ensuring
that any economic interests of the researchers play no role in the conduct of the
research study. Informed consent serves six functions in the research context: (1) to
promote individual autonomy; (2) to protect the patient-subject's status as a human
being; (3) to avoid fraud and duress; (4) to encourage self-scrutiny by the physicianinvestigator; (5) to encourage rational decision making; and (6) to involve the
public. 196 But the list can generally be distilled down to two primary principlespromoting individual autonomy and encouraging rational decision making.' 97 These
two principles are similar to those in the treatment context.198 By ensuring that the
patient or representative is in control of the overall decisions regarding treatment,
and that the patient's decisions are educated and systematic, the researchers meet the
requirements for informed consent. The researchers themselves directly benefit from
obtaining this informed consent because it generally minimizes the risk of a lawsuit
being brought by the subject.' 99 If the patient perceives that she is involved in the
process, and actually in control of the process, the risk of a lawsuit decreases. As a
group, society also benefits from ensuring patient autonomy and rational decision
making because these factors facilitate productive and accurate research. 2"
Informed consent in research suffers from the same problem of patient or subject
comprehension that exists during treatment. The difficulty of assuring actual patient
or subject comprehension is illustrated by a recent study conducted in Haiti. 20 ' The
study involved testing volunteers' understanding of a consent form before they
signed the form.20 2 Study participants were given the opportunity to seek
clarification of any elements on the form during the informed consent process.0 3
The researchers concluded that a single meeting to discuss a subject's involvement
in a trial might be insufficient to ensure that the subject comprehends the study and
that a series of meetings greatly increased a subject's understanding of the consent
that the consent of a parent alone cannot make appropriate that which is innately inappropriate.
Id. The parent-child relationship has been expanded to include all vulnerable populations. "[I]t is not possible for
a guardian.. .to consent to a non-therapeutic research intervention on an incompetent person in his or her care."
Sommerville, supra note 181, at 86.
196. E.g., ANNAS ET AL., supra note 40, at 33.
197. See, e.g., id. at 34; JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL
PRACTICE 76 (1987).

198. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
199. Ellen Wright Clayton et al., Informed Consentfor Genetic Research on Stored Tissue Samples, 274
JAMA 1786, 1787 (1995). "The possibility of unhappiness and even litigation later on may be greatly reduced by
early disclosure, discussion, and the opportunity to refuse to participate." Id.
200. See id. Further, "society benefits from the communal commitment embodied in an individual's knowing
decision to participate in research." id.
201.

Daniel W. Fitzgerald, Comprehension During Informed Consent in a Less-Developed Country, 360

LANCET 1301, 1301 (2002).
202. Id.
203. Id.
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form.2 04 Attempting to obtain informed consent in a single, discrete encounter led
to overload and might be a wasted effort for all parties involved.2 °5 Further, the
participants were illiterate, and the need to communicate without writing limited the
amount of information that could be discussed at each meeting.2
The results of the study reinforce the idea that informed consent is a process, not
a discrete event. For the process to function correctly, the information flow from the
researchers to the participants must be monitored by the researchers to ensure that
the subjects do not become saturated with information and that true informed
consent occurs. In addition to the problem of subject comprehension, other hurdles
to overcome include selection bias and the economic interests of the researchers
themselves.
1. Selection Bias
From a purely scientific point of view, ensuring that participation is limited only
to subjects that have proven that they fully understand the information presented can
lead to selection bias.20 7 In a recent observational study, researchers found that the
informed consent process was inadequate for the needs of most subjects despite
meeting all of the elements of informed consent. 20 8 The researchers found that only
twenty-two percent of the participants were sufficiently educated to understand the
information presented, and only eighteen percent of the participants actually read the
consent forms before making a decision as to participation in the trial.2"9
Unfortunately, those subjects who were incapable of giving informed consent may
actually be the ones who would most benefit from participation in the study. 2'0 As
a result, researchers may be left in a frustrating position in which a group of
individuals could truly benefit from the research but is prevented from participating
because of the inability to obtain informed consent from the individual members of
the group.
The researchers ultimately concluded that the informed consent process could be
a substantial barrier to the inclusion of some necessary populations in a study.21
Clearly this is undesirable because it raises the possibility that researchers are more
concerned with completing their studies than they are in complying with the
informed consent process. The fact that one does not hear of a research study being
cancelled because informed consent could not be obtained implies that unethical
research currently continues.

204. Id. at 1301-02. The informed consent process occurred during three separate thirty to forty minute
sessions over a span of seven to ten days. Id. at 1301.
205. Id. at 1302.
206. Id.
207. See Nina Hannover Bjarnason & Jens Peter Kampmann, Letter to the Editors, Selection Bias Introduced
by the Informed Consent Process, 361 LANCEr 1990, 1990 (2003). "The randomised controlled trial is the
cornerstone for assessment of new therapies, but its value as a true sample of the total population is highly
dependent on the recruitment process." Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. There is a similar concern with emergency patients. See infra Part W.B.2.
211. Bjarnason & Kampmann, supranote 207, at 1990.
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2. Economic Interests of the Researchers
The duty to obtain informed consent does not necessarily require researchers to
disclose their economic interests. 2 A federal district court in Florida ruled in 2003
that a physician researcher did not breach his duty to obtain informed consent when
conducting medical research on blood and tissue samples of volunteer subjects.2 13
The subjects suffered from Canavan's disease, a fatal genetic disorder.214 At the time
the study began, there was no mechanism to identify carriers of the disease-causing
gene. 2 "5 The plaintiffs approached a single researcher to perform the genetic
research.2" 6 Once the gene was isolated, the researcher obtained a patent for work
based on the subjects' samples. 21 7 The subjects brought a suit demanding that the
research results remain in the public domain to assist other researchers with finding
a cure for the disease. 21" They alleged that the physician had not informed them of
his intention to seek a219patent on the research and by doing so had breached his duty
of informed consent.
In finding for the defendant physician, the court ruled that the duty to disclose
extended to the actual research alone, not to the researcher's economic interests
(such as patents). 220 The court recognized, however, that this area of law was
"unsettled and fact-specific... [and] that in certain circumstances a medical
researcher does have a duty [to obtain] informed consent" when economic interests
are at issue. 22' The court gave no explanation for this statement, leaving one to
wonder exactly what those certain circumstances could be. The court concluded its
analysis of the informed consent claim by acknowledging the American Medical
Association's Code of Ethics guidelines for physicians and researchers.2 22 The court
observed that that the guidelines require potential commercial applications to be
disclosed to the subject before the researcher engages in profit-seeking activity.223
Nevertheless, the court accorded the rule little deference, refusing to factor the rule
into its analysis.224
When one considers the possibility that a researcher's motives might be
225
influenced to some extent by the potential for profit, this seems an odd result.

212. See Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1070-71 (S.D. Fla.

2003).
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
Id. at 1066.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1067.
Id. at 1068.
Id.

220. Id. at 1069-71.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1070 n.2.

223. Id.
224. Id. The court stated that "these regulations were only promulgated in 1994 and there is no evidence that
they bind the parties in this case." Id. This is a strange result, considering the court's opinion was written in
2003-nine years after the regulations were published.
225. For a discussion of financial conflicts of interest among researchers and the potential deleterious effects
on research subjects, see Bernard Lo et al., Conflict-of-InterestPoliciesfor Investigatorsin ClinicalTrials, 343 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1616 (2000). The authors find a substantial disparity among conflict of interest policies at the ten
medical schools receiving the most funding from the National Institutes of Health. Id. at 1616. Among the
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When research is involved, subjects of studies require more protection than patients
receiving treatment because there is no direct benefit to the research subject, as
opposed to the treatment of a patient. The court should have followed the AMA
guidelines that require a physician to discuss economic issues with the research
subject, because this would have provided the participant with complete information
on the range of the study.
D. The Oversight of Research and Informed Consent by InstitutionalReview
Boards
Recognizing that additional protections are needed in the research context, federal
regulations require institutional review boards (IRBs) to ensure that research studies
are conducted ethically and with the full informed consent of the participants.226
IRBs provide the initial approval of a research study and then conduct a continuing
review of the study to ensure ongoing compliance with institutional policies and
procedures. 227 By federal statute, IRBs "review and have authority to approve,
require modifications in.. .or disapprove all research activities [of their parent
organization]. 228 IRBs are responsible for mitigating unnecessary risks for subjects
enrolled in research protocols 229 and for guarding against the exploitation of those
subjects.23 ° The specific role of the IRBs is to assure the protection of research
subjects and "to ascertain the acceptability of proposed research in terms of
institutional commitments and regulations, applicable law, and standards of
professional conduct and practice. 23 ' When certain conditions are met, IRBs may
also waive the informed consent requirement for studies under their purview.232
IRBs do not always effectively protect research subjects. One of the reasons for
this is the composition of the membership. An IRB's membership must be
composed of a minimum of five members, at least one of whom must be a
layperson.23 3 Because the majority of the members are physicians and other
healthcare professionals, the probability of receiving approval from an LRB is much
higher than if there were a greater number of lay members. 23" Some argue that an

recommendations to address the problem is the implementation of a prohibition on stock or stock option ownership
in the companies involved with the research. Nor should researchers hold positions of authority in a company
potentially affected by their research results. Id. at 1619.
226. See Robert D. Trung et al., Is Informed Consent Always Necessaryfor Randomized, Controlled Trials?,
340 NEw ENG. J. MED. 804, 806 (1999); Halikas v. Univ. of Minn., 856 F. Supp. 1331, 1334 (D. Minn. 1994) ("The
IRB is the mechanism by which a medical research institution maintains [its] integrity and humanity.").
227. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(e) (2005).
228. Id. § 46.109(a).
229. See Robert Steinbrook, TrialDesign and PatientSafety-The Debate Continues, 349 NEw ENG. J. MED.
629, 630 (2003).
230. See Truog et al., supra note 226, at 806.
231. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a) (2005).
232. See id. § 46.116(d) (2005). For a detailed discussion of waiver in the research context, see infra Part
IV.D.2.
233. See 45 C.F.R § 46.107(a). "Each IRB shall include at least one member whose primary concerns are in
scientific areas and at least one member whose primary concerns are in nonscientific areas." Id. § 46.107(c). The
National Bioethics Advisory Commission recommended that members whose primary concerns are in nonscientific
areas should comprise at least twenty-five percent of IRB membership. See Steinbrook, supra note 176, at 1428.
234. H. Peter Steeves, "Start a Line and Get Me a Consent Waiver, STAT!": Autonomy, Community
Consultation, and Informed Consent in Emergency Research, Special Issue, QUEEN 44, http://www.ars-
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inherent conflict of interest exists because IRB members are potentially reluctant to
pass judgment on their own colleagues' research due to the fact that they could find
themselves applying to an IRB in the future for permission to conduct research.235
This result persists despite the fact that the federal regulations prohibit members
with conflicts of interest from participating within the IRB.236
IRBs can also experience difficulty in remaining true to their mission. In Grimes
v. Kennedy KriegerInstitute, Inc., a Maryland appellate court stated that RBs can
place a premium on the success of experiments, often to the detriment of the
ethicality of experiments.23 7 In that case, the IRB encouraged researchers to
misrepresent the purpose of a study in order to guarantee a lower level of scrutiny.238
By encouraging misrepresentation, the IRB overlooked "its primary role.. .to assure
the safety of human research subjects-not help researchers avoid safety or healthrelated requirements. The IRB, in this case, misconceived, at least partially, its own
'
role."239
Because the study involved children, a vulnerable population, it drew close
scrutiny from the court.2' The court found that the children were healthy at the onset
of the study and that there was no therapeutic benefit to them from participation in
the research.2 4 In ruling against the researchers, the court held that (a) there was no
informed consent because this information was withheld and (b) "a parent,
appropriate relative, or other applicable surrogate, cannot consent to the
participation of a child or other person under legal disability in nontherapeutic
research or studies in which there is any risk of injury or damage to the health of the
subject." 242 The court in Grimes was the first to recognize this rule.243 The special
relationship between subject and researcher now clearly extended to the IRB. 24
A recent analysis of effectiveness providing both criticisms of and
recommendations for the role of IRBs was presented to the Government Reform and
Oversight Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1998.245 The resulting
report concluded that IRBs conducted only minimal ongoing review of research that
rhetorica.net/QueenlVolumeSpeciallssue/Articles/Steeves.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2006). A rather vivid analogy
is painted by describing an IRB packed with physicians as "'putting Dracula in charge of the blood bank."' Id.
(quoting Paul McNeill, InternationalTrends in Research Regulation: Science as Negotiation, in RESEARCH ON
HUMAN SUBJECTS: ETHICS, LAW AND SOCIAL PoucY 243, 245 (David N. Weisstub ed., 1998)).
235. See Carnahan,supra note 29, at 586-87.
236. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(e) ("No IRB may have a member participate in [an] initial or continuing review
of any project in which the member has a conflicting interest...."); see also Steinbrook, supra note 176, at 1426 ("If
the [IRBs] are effective, they may block or delay the approval of research that is important to the financial health
and reputation of the institutions that created them.").
237. See Grimes, 782 A.2d 807, 817 (Md. 2001). IRBs "are not designed.. .to be sufficiently objective in the
sense that they are as sufficiently concerned with the ethicality of the experiments they review as they are with the
success of the experiments." Id.
238. Id.; see supra Part IMI.B.
239. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 814.
240. Id. at 817.
241. Id. at 815; see supra Partll.B.
242. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 858. This has obvious echoes of the Nuremberg Code, which does not allow for
surrogate consent of any kind. See TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 105, at 181-82; see also supra Part
I].A. 1 (discussing the Nuremberg Code).
243. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 846.
244. Id. at 817.
245. InstitutionalReview Boards: A System in Jeopardy:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Res. of
the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform & Oversight, 105th Cong. 14 (1998) (statement of George F. Grob, Deputy
Inspector General for Evaluation and Inspections, Department of Health & Human Services).
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they had approved, 2" that too much was reviewed at too great a speed, 247 that
insufficient resources were allocated for self-analysis of effectiveness,2 48 and that
little training was provided to its members or to the researchers themselves. 249
The study made several recommendations for improvement to the IRB
environment. ° These recommendations included granting more flexibility to the
IRBs in order to increase their accountability, re-engineering the federal oversight
process to include criteria for the recruitment and selection process of subjects, and
" '
improving the education that IRB members and researchers receive.25
Responding to these recommendations, the Department of Health and Human
Services established the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) in 2000.252
The OHRP was charged with the regulation of "institutions and other entities that
'
conduct or oversee studies involving human subjects."253
Under these regulations,
IRBs fell under the jurisdiction of the OHRP, which regulates and investigates
complaints related to IRBs. 254 The OHRP's authority is derived from the written
pledge that research organizations sign in which they agree to comply with federal
regulations. 5
The FDA also took steps to monitor the work of IRBs and to ensure subject
protection by establishing the Office for Good Clinical Practice in 2001. 6 The
Office is responsible for approximately 50,000 active clinical investigators and
2,500 IRBs.257 Not to be outdone, in 2002 the National Institute of Health announced
a $28.5 million program designed to assist institutions in monitoring their ongoing
clinical research."5 8

246. Id at 17-18. "One IRB member told us that he reviews the continuing review summaries during the
board meeting to see if a patient has died. If no patient has died, then he generally will not raise questions." Id. at
17.
247. Id. at 18-19. "We found average increases of 42 percent in initial reviews during the past 5 years at the
sites we visited." Id. at 18.
248. Id. at 19-22. Admittedly this is because there is little empirical data with which to conduct such an
evaluation. Id. at 20-21. The dean of one medical school thought that the IRB was doing a good job if they did not
contact him. Id. at 20. But IRBs have rarely sought feedback from the researchers or the subjects. Id.
249. Id. at 22-23. "For new IRB members, their orientation to the role is seldom much more than a stack of
materials to read and on-the-job learning." Id. at 23.
250. Id. at 23-27.
251. Id.
252. See Steinbrook, supra note 176, at 1426; U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Office for Human
Research Protections, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
253. Steinbrook, supra note 176, at 1426. The OHRP's Director has stated that its mission is clear-cut. "'It
is not as if we need another thoughtful analysis of things....All we need in some respects is an action plan."' Id.
The scope of OHRP's activities is broad. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., OHRP Fact Sheet,
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/about/ohrpfactsheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2006). Amongst the Office's specific duties
are serving as the compliance enforcement arm of HHS-approved human subject research, investigating all
allegations of noncompliance, offering guidance on statutory interpretation, and providing educational programs
on the human subject research process. Id.
254. See Steinbrook, supra note 176, at 1426.
255. Id. at 1425-26.
256. Id. at 1427.
257. See id.
258. See id. at 1429. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) is the principal federal agency providing funds
for biomedical research. Its mission is to ensure that the funded research complies with HHS regulations. NIH also
issues its own guidelines for data and safety monitoring, as well as education of the researchers themselves. See
Nat'l Insts. of Health, Questions and Answers About NIH, http://www.nih.gov/aboutlFaqs.htm#NIH (last visited
Nov. 29, 2006).
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Meanwhile, the number of IRBs continues to grow. 9 Between 1999 and 2002,
seven of the eleven schools receiving the largest amount of financial support from
the National Institute of Health added IRBs. 2 ° While this increases the burden on
the governmental agencies established to supervise these organizations, it should
ease the workload of the individual IRBs themselves.
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE
The requirements of informed consent may be modified or disregarded under
certain circumstances.2 6' These circumstances create exceptions to the doctrine in
both the treatment and research contexts. While the exceptions to informed consent
for treatment can be distinguished from each other, they all focus on championing
the individual's health.262 This value focuses on "the health of the individual for the
individual's own sake, the maintenance and promotion of the health of loved ones,
and the assurance that the medical and related professions are free to practice
responsibly in accordance with sound professional dictates., 263 The exceptions for
research studies arise as a result of the difficulty in finding an adequate number of
subjects for the studies.2"
There are four generally recognized exceptions to the requirement to obtain
informed consent.265 First, consent is presumed in the diagnostic phase of therapy.
Second, a patient may not be competent to make an informed decision, usually in
the case of an emergency. Third, disclosure may be harmful to the patient. Fourth,
patients may waive their right to informed consent. 266 Also included in the list of
exceptions are low-risk surgeries, common procedures, or procedures such as
childbirth that do not require a decision.267
A. Presumed Consent
1. In the Treatment Context
Although the common law generally does not allow the treatment of an individual
without his informed consent, in some cases consent may be presumed.2 61 In
diagnostic situations such as drawing blood, taking a temperature, or conducting
routine physical exams, obtaining the informed consent of the patient is unnecessary

259. See Steinbrook, supranote 176, at 1428.
260. See id.
261. See, e.g., BERG ET AL., supra note 197, at 76.
262. See Meisel, supra note 5, at 487.
263. See id.; Charles Marwick, Assessment of Exception to Informed Consent, 278 JAMA 1392, 1393 (1997).
Some believe that the recognition of exceptions to the doctrine creates a slippery slope that erodes individual
protections. In referring to the exceptions, for example, one IRB member commented, "'We gave people the right
to informed consent, now we have turned around and taken it back."' Id.
264. See Carnahan, supra note 29, at 567.
265. See, e.g., Rich, supra note 1, at 329.
266. See id. at 329-30.
267. J.D. LEE & BARRY LtNDAHL, 3 MODERN TORT LAw: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 25:40 (2d ed. 2003).

268. E.g., Carnahan, supra note 29, at 574; see also The United Kingdom Parliament (House of Commons)
Organ Donation (Presumed Consent and Safeguards) Bill (Feb. 3, 2004), available at http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ cm200304/cmbills/047/2004047.htm (discussing presumed consent for donating organs upon
death).
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because the procedures are only diagnostic and are minimally invasive.269 The
presumption of consent stems from the physician-patient relationship, in which it is
understood that the physician will do no harm to the patient and will perform the
necessary procedures to diagnose the patient's illness. Requiring the patient's
informed consent is unnecessary in the diagnostic stage because treatment has not
yet begun.
Courts, however, have not always hewn to this distinction between diagnosis and
treatment. In Morgan v. MacPhail, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not
distinguish between diagnostic and therapeutic procedures, but rather based its
analysis on the distinction between medical and surgical procedures.27 ° In doing so,
the court held that the requirement to obtain informed consent applied solely to
surgical procedures. 27' Thus, the non-surgical administration of medication fell
outside the doctrine and did not require consent. In Morgan, the plaintiff sued her
physician for failing to inform her of potential side effects from nerve block
injections.27 2 The court held that actions for breach of informed consent were only
appropriate for surgical procedures,273because they involved the physical contact
necessary to sustain a battery action:
The rationale underlying requiring informed consent for a surgical or operative
procedure and not requiring informed consent for a non-surgical procedure is
that the performance of a surgical procedure upon a patient without his consent
constitutes a technical assault or a battery because the patient is typically
unconscious and unable to object ....
The patient, appellants urge, has the right
to make an informed choice as to electing to undergo a medical procedure after
having been presented with the alternatives and the risks attendant to each
alternative. This argument, however, flies in the face of the traditional battery
theory. It is the invasive nature of the surgical or operative procedure..
.that
274
gives rise to the need to inform the patient of risks prior to surgery.
The dissent in Morgan pointed out that "there is no basis to require informed
' The dissenting
consent before surgery but not before other medical procedures."275
justice stated the obvious: "Many non-surgical procedures involve a touching and
may be technical batteries without informed consent just like surgery ....
[Informed
consent should be required for medical procedures beyond surgery. ' 276 He
concluded that "there is no basis to distinguish between surgical and non-surgical
procedures in the law of informed consent."277

269. But see Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 907 (Cal. 1980) (holding that diagnostic tests require the
informed consent of the patient). See also supra Part n1(discussing Truman).
270. 704 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1997).
271. Id. at619-20.
272. Id. at 618-20.
273. "It has long been the law in Pennsylvania that a physician must obtain informed consent from a patient
before performing a surgical or operative procedure. Informed consent, however, has not been required in cases
involving non-surgical procedures." Id. at 619-20 (citations omitted).
274. Id. at 620 (citation omitted).
275. Id. at 621 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 622.
277. Id. at 621.
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The majority's reasoning in Morgan is an anomaly. One can only assume that the
court was determined not to apply a negligence standard when evaluating informed
consent, unlike the rest of the country. The prevailing view remains that informed
consent is required for all medical and surgical treatment, unless consent is
presumed for diagnostic procedures.278
2. In the Research Context
There is no presumed consent in the research context because of the increased
protection given to research subjects. 279 The Code of Federal Regulations, however,
provides for several research settings where informed consent is not required. These
include research on educational or interview methods or techniques; 28 0 research
involving the analysis of publicly available, anonymous specimens; 28 1 research
involving the analysis of public service programs; 212 and research involving the taste
and quality of foods. 8 3 These studies, unlike medical research, do not require the
informed consent of the subjects because they do not involve actual subject
interaction. Instead, the researchers are simply engaging in the analysis of data. If
necessary, however, the regulation provides for protection of the subjects by
allowing for federal department or agency heads to impose informed consent
requirements on these types of studies, regardless of the regulatory provisions.2 4
3. Genetic Research and the Collection of Data
The crossroads of a physician's duty to warn a patient of a genetically inheritable
disease and the right to informed consent is gaining increased attention.2 5 The

278. See supra Part I.B.
279. See Michelle H. Biros, Research Without Consent: CurrentStatus, 2003, 42 ANNALS EmERGENCY MED.
550, 551 (2003).
280. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(1)-(2) (2005).
Research conducted in established or commonly accepted educational settings, involving normal
educational practices, such as (i) research on regular and special education instructional
strategies, or (ii) research on the effectiveness of or the comparison among instructional
techniques, curricula, or classroom management methods. Research involving the use of
educational tests,.. survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior....
Id.
281. See id § 46. l01(b)(4) ("Research, involving the collection or study of existing data, documents, records,
pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens, if these sources are publicly available or if the information is
recorded by the investigator in such a manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked
to the subjects.").
282. See id. § 46.101(b)(5) ("Research and demonstration projects which are conducted by or subject to the
approval of department or agency heads, and which are designed to study, evaluate, or otherwise examine: (i) Public
benefit or service programs....").
283. See id. § 46.101(b)(6).
Taste and food quality evaluation and consumer acceptance studies, (i) if wholesome foods
without additives are consumed or (ii) if a food is consumed that contains a food ingredient at
or below the level and for a use found to be safe, or agricultural chemical or environmental
contaminant at or below the level found to be safe, by the Food and Drug Administration or
approved by the Environmental Protection Agency or the Food Safety and Inspection Service
of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Id.
284. See id. § 46.101(b) ("Unless otherwise required by department or agency heads.....
285. See Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1995) ("[1]n any circumstances in which the physician
has a duty to warn of a genetically transferable disease, that duty will be satisfied by warning the patient.").
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dueling interests of a patient's right to consent to the use of individual genetic
information contrasted with the potential effect of that information on another's
health (or wallet) is an issue that is being debated on the national stage. The U.S.
Senate's recent passage of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act is one
example of this national interest.286 The bill bans discrimination by insurers based
on an individual's genetic blueprint and is one of the first pieces of national
legislation aimed solely at genetics.287
Professionals within the field have a strong predilection toward self-determination
in genetic testing.2 8 That is, receiving advice regarding genetic testing is based on
an individual's informed consent: once people learn of the risks and available
options, educated decisions based on personal values and beliefs can then be
made.289 Some commentators urge that this decision-whether to learn of one's
genetic predisposition-should be protected under the Due Process Clause, akin to
other privacy rights.2
The American Society of Human Genetics' Statement on Informed Consentfor
Genetic Research outlined a few of the key issues in the field.29' It encouraged
anonymization of genetic samples derived from research or, alternatively, full
informed consent.292 The informed consent was broad in its requirements but
allowed for waiver.293 Satisfaction of the requirements for waiver, however, still
leaves several issues unresolved.

286. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, S. 306, 109th Cong. (2005); Brian DeBose, Senate
Votes to Ban Bias Based on Genetic Makeup, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2005, at A6, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryED=-20050217-114810-9747r.
287. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, S. 306 § 2. "Genetic information" is defined in the bill
as "information about (i) an individual's genetic tests; (ii) the genetic tests of family members of the individual; or
(iii) the occurrence of a disease or disorder in family members of the individual." Id. § 201(5).
288. Sonia M. Suter, Note, Whose Genes Are These Anyway? Familial Conflicts over Access to Genetic
Information, 91 MIcH. L REv. 1854, 1894 (1993).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1905. "Legislation or judicial decisions should be made with an eye toward encouraging informed
consent, education, and genetic counseling services so that people can determine whether genetic testing is
appropriate for them." Id at 1906.
291. American Society of Human Genetics, Statement on Informed Consentfor Genetic Research, 59 AM.
J. HUMAN GENETICS 471, 471 (1996).
292. Id.
293. Id.
Subjects providing consent for prospective studies should be told about the types of information
that could result from genetic research. Subjects must be given sufficient information to
understand the implications and the limitations of research. Individuals should be told the
purpose, limitations, possible outcomes, and means of communicating results and maintaining
confidentiality... .the possibility of adverse psychological sequelae, disruption of family
dynamics, and social stigmatization and discrimination.
The consent form should not promise significant breakthroughs in diagnosis, treatment or
outcome to entice participation.
It is inappropriate to ask a subject to grant blanket consent for all future unspecified genetic
research projects on any disease or in any area if the samples are identifiable in those subsequent
studies.
Subjects involved in studies in which the samples are identified or identifiable should
indicate if unused portions of the samples may be shared with other researchers.
Id at 473-74. The Statement points out that, while waiver is permitted when identifiable samples are used, the
research subject should be contacted again to confirm consent. Then the four-part waiver test is employed. See infra
Part IV.D.2.
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While one of the prerequisites for waiver is "minimal risk,' 294 defining that term
in the context of genetic research is problematic.295 Customary use of the phrase
refers to minimal physical risk, but physical risk is largely confined to drawing the
blood sample involved with genetic research. 29 Instead, social and psychological
risks must be taken into consideration. The traditional informed consent doctrine has
not contemplated risk in these terms, and precisely how to account for them is a
topic of some debate.
The Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing recently struggled with
this issue in the regulatory context. 297 In attempting to develop a Proposed Rule for
genetic testing, the committee ultimately "concluded that fundamental, irresolvable
questions had been raised about the feasibility of categorizing tests for oversight
purposes based on a limited set of elements in a simple, linear fashion .... [and]
decided that further efforts to develop a classification methodology for genetic tests
should be curtailed." 298 The Committee essentially decided to relegate the task of
developing a classification methodology for genetic testing to the FDA. 299 The FDA
has yet to publish a proposal for the regulatory classification of genetic research,
including a risk classification system.
Extreme care must be taken to inform the subject of possible future uses of
genetic material. 30° As in Greenberg, courts have acknowledged that there are
certain situations where a researcher must inform his subjects of the economic
interests raised by the research.3 °' It is but a short step from economic interests to the
interests of family members, the public, the media, or other third parties.
Of further concern are international efforts such as the building of a national
genetic database by a private company in Iceland. 302 While the intent of the database
is to address public health concerns in the country and to allow for the development
of commercial products, 3 3 it employs presumed consent with an opt-out
provision-a system supported by seventy-five percent of the country. 3°4 However,
one wonders if the population understands precisely how accessible their genetic
data will be. While the data is intended to be anonymized, doubts have been raised

294. Amy A. Ernst et a]., Minimal-Risk Waiver of Informed Consent and Exceptionfrom Informed Consent
(FinalRule) Studies at InstitutionalReview Boards Nationwide, 12 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1134, 1134 (2005).

295. LoRi B. ANDREWS ET AL., GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY 108 (2002).
296. See id. at 104 (noting that once a sample is drawn, making the donor anonymous eliminates the need to
obtain informed consent for further research).
297. See SEC'Y'S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETIC TESTING, NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, ENHANCING THE
OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SACGT 7 (2000), http://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/sacgt/
reports/oversight-report.pdf.
298. SEC'Y'S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETIC TESTING, NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, DEVELOPMENT OF A
CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY FORGENETICTESTS: CONCLUSIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS OFTHE SECRETARY'S
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETIC TESTING 11 (2001), http://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/sacgt/reports/Addendumfinal.pdf.

299. Id.
300.
supra Part
301.
302.

See Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003); see
ll.C.2.
See Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
See Ross Anderson, The DeCODE Proposal for an Icelandic Health Database (1998),

http://www.ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rjal4/iceland.pdf.
303. See Jamaica Potts, At Least Give the Natives GlassBeads: An Examinationof the BargainMade Between
Iceland and deCode Genetics with Implicationsfor Global Bioprospecting, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 24-25 (2002).
304. Id. at 24 n.7 1. The support rate grew to ninety-one percent in polls taken after passage of the bill. Id.
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about the capability of actually de-identifying individual genetic data.3"' If even
some of those doubts are true, then there has been a major break from the traditional
informed consent doctrine mandating that identifiable
health information must not
3 6
be accessible without the patient's consent. 0
B. Incompetence
Individuals who are incompetent as a result of a mental disability, such as
schizophrenia, are distinguished from those who are incompetent as a result of an
emergency situation, such as a heart attack or stroke. Informed consent requirements
for patients with mental disabilities are met through the use of surrogates or legal
representatives for the patients." Informed consent requirements for incompetent
patients in emergency situations are met through the application of surrogate
consent, presumed consent, or an exception to the doctrine that allows for treatment
without informed consent.
1. Emergency Treatment
The emergency treatment exception applies "when there is a sudden marked
change in the patient's condition so.. .action is immediately necessary for the
preservation of life or the prevention of serious bodily harm to the patient or
others.... "308 Specifically, informed consent is not required
when the patient is unconscious or otherwise incapable of consenting, and harm
from a failure to treat is imminent and outweighs any harm threatened by the
proposed treatment. When a genuine emergency of that sort arises, it is settled
that the impracticality of conferring with the patient dispenses with the need for
it. Even in situations of that character the physician should, as current law
requires, attempt to secure a relative's consent ifpossible. But if time is too short
to accommodate discussion, obviously the physician should proceed with the
treatment. 309
The emergency treatment "exception" actually encompasses several conceptsimplied consent,1 ° presumed consent,3'and surrogate consent.312 For example, at
the scene of an accident paramedics do not seek consent prior to removing the
patient from his car, nor do they seek permission to initiate cardiopulmonary

305. Anderson, supra note 302, at 3. ("[Ilt is effectively impossible to de-identify longitudinal records, that
is, records which link together all (or even many) of the health care encounters in a patient's life."). There is at least
some evidence that deCode publicly acknowledged this fact. Id. at 4.
306. See id. at 4, 11.
307. See Meisel, supra note 5, at 451. A discussion of mental disability and the use of surrogates is beyond
the scope of this Article.
308. See BERG ET AL., supra note 197, at 76.
309. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788-89 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (footnotes omitted).
310. See Williams v. Payne, 73 F. Supp. 2d 785, 803 (E.D. Mich. 1999); Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A.2d 626,
629 (D.C. 1943); Curtis v. Jaskey, 759 N.E.2d 962, 967 (IH.App. Ct. 2001); Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225,226
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1920).
311. See Carnahan,supra note 29, at 574 ("Presumed consent is based on the presumption that a reasonable
person would consent to treatment based on the best judgment of the treating physician."); see also Rich, supranote
1, at 329.
312. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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resuscitation.3 3 Instead, they proceed on the assumption that, if the patient were
competent, he or she would consent to the procedures. However, if a patient
expressly states that she does not want a certain type or modality of care, the
physician cannot use the emergency exception to override her express wishes.314
"'Carried to its extreme.. .the doctrine of implied consent could effectively
nullify' an individual's right to refuse medical treatment."3 5 As an example, in
Curtis v. Jaskey a patient brought a battery action against her physician for an
episiotomy performed during the patient's labor.316 The patient had expressly
forbidden the physician from performing the procedure.3 7 In holding for the patient,
the court stated that, "in the face of a clear refusal to submit to a medical procedure,
the emergency exception is inapplicable., 3 8 The court also stated that "a patient can
delimit the scope of the relationship, and thus the scope of the physician's duty [to
provide care], by withholding consent to particular procedures. 3 9
In summary, an exception to informed consent exists when emergency situations
require patient treatment. Because patients are often not competent to give consent
in these types of situations, informed consent may be presumed. The law assumes
that the patient, as a reasonable person, would consent to the care if she was capable
of doing so. This presumption is a limited one. The treating physician must heed the
patient's express requests, thereby recognizing the value of patient autonomy in the
treatment context. While the treatment is given for the good of the individual
patient, the patient's wishes are also honored, even if those wishes are against the
better judgment of a physician.
2. Emergency Research
An exception to the requirement for informed consent in the research context
exists in cases of clinical studies of emergency conditions such as cardiac arrests,
strokes, and overdoses. 32' The goal of the exception is to meet the growing need for
research by providing researchers with access to otherwise inaccessible subjects for
acute care studies. 321 Although there is good reason to presume that people requiring
emergency medical treatment would consent to treatment if they could, a similar
presumption in the research context is dangerous. While the potential for harm
always exists in the sometimes-frenzied situation of emergency treatment, the
patient's welfare is the first priority. In contrast, when conducting research during
emergency situations, the focus is not on the individual. The special protections in

313. Lindsey Tanner, Artificial Blood Tested Without Consent, SYMPATICO HEALTH & FITNESs, Feb. 19,
2004, http://mediresource.sympatico.ca/healthnewsdetaii.asp?channelid=14&newsid=3402.
314. Curtis v. Jaskey, 759 N.E.2d 962, 967 (I. App. Ct. 2001); Shine v. Vega, 709 N.E.2d 58, 65 (Mass.
1999) ("[A] competent patient's refusal to consent to medical treatment cannot be overridden whenever the patient
faces a life-threatening situation.").
315. Curtis, 759 N.E.2d at 967 (quoting Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1053 (Ohio Ct. App.
1984)).
316. Id. at963.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 968.
319. Id.
320. See Marwick, supra note 263, at 1392.
321. See Susan Alpert, Taking the Lead, 6 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1187, 1189 (1999); Carnahan, supra
note 29, at 568.
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research become even more crucial because of the incapacity of the subjects in the
emergency research context.
For the emergency research exception to apply, an IRB must find that the
researchers have met ten requirements.3 22 First, research subjects must be in a-lifethreatening situation, available treatments must be unproven or unsatisfactory, and
collecting scientific evidence must be necessary to determine the safety and
effectiveness of the intervention.323 Second, obtaining informed consent must be
impossible because the medical condition prevents the subject from consenting, the
timeframe is too narrow to allow for contact of a legally authorized representative,
and there is no practical means of prospectively identifying likely candidates for the
study.324 Third, participation in the study must potentially yield a direct benefit to
the subject.325 Fourth, the study could not be completed without the exception.326
Fifth, the "proposed investigational plan defines the length of the potential
therapeutic window based on scientific evidence" and an attempt to obtain consent
from a legally authorized representative must be made during this window and
documented.327 Sixth, the IRB must approve of the procedures and documents
relating to informed consent from a competent subject or a legally authorized
representative.32 8 Seventh, the community in which the research will occur must be
consulted.329 The risks and benefits of the study must be made public prior to
beginning the research, and the study's results and subject demographics must be
made public upon completion. 33 ' Eighth, if the subject is unable to consent and a
legally authorized representative is not available, the researchers must attempt to
contact, within the therapeutic window, a family member to determine if there is an
objection to enrolling the subject in the study. 33' Ninth, if there is no consent and the
subject is enrolled, procedures must exist to inform the subject, a legally authorized
representative, or a family member of the subject's enrollment.332 Any of those three
parties may terminate the subject's enrollment at any time.333 Should the subject die,
information on the circumstances surrounding the death must be provided to the
representative or family member, if feasible. 334 Finally, the study may not begin until

322. See Bateman et al., supra note 168, at 1319; Steeves, supra note 234 (noting nine requirements); see also
Carnahan, supra note 29, at 565. Carnahan's article includes a thorough discussion of the issues relating to the
emergency research exception, including ambiguities that arise from the application of the exception, as well as
recommendations to improve its use. But see Nino Stocchetti et al., Letter to the Editors, New European Directive
on Clinical Trials, 361 LANCET 1473 (2003) (discussing how European legislation does not provide for the
exception, which creates a concern that patients will be deprived of treatment because of the inability to procure
consent).
323. 21 C.F.R. § 50.24(a)(1) (2006); Etchells, supra note 13, at 1218.
324. 21 C.F.R. § 50.24(a)(2)(i)-(iii).
325. Id. § 50.24(a)(3)(i)-(iii).
326. Id. § 50.24(a)(4).
327. Id. § 50.24(a)(5).
328. Id. § 50.24(a)(6).
329. ld. § 50.24(a)(7)(i).
330. Id. § 50.24(a)(7)(ii)-(iii).
331. Id. § 50.24(a)(7)(v).
332. Id. § 50.24(b).
333. Id.
334. Id.
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the FDA grants written authorization to the researchers 335 based on information
provided in an application to the FDA. 336 By requiring that these ten conditions be
met, the subject who cannot consent to enroll in the study is protected.
Since the regulations were instituted in 1996, the FDA has approved
approximately fifteen applications to conduct research using the emergency
exception. 337 The first clinical trial to use the exception tested the effectiveness of
a drug that is infused during traumatic hemorrhagic shock.33' To maximize the
drug's benefits, infusion must occur within thirty minutes of the trauma. 339 In
granting the application under the emergency research exception, the FDA
considered "[tihe unpredictable nature of trauma, the severity of illness in the target
patient population, and the need to initiate emergency therapy in a brief time
period."34°
Research on the use of prospective informed consent, the consent exception, and
consent to continue 34 in the study revealed the following: informed consent or
consent to continue was obtained or requested for ninety-one of the ninety-eight
patients (ninety-three percent). 42 Seven patients (seven percent) failed to give
informed consent or consent to continue.?3 Six patients (six percent) gave
prospective informed consent-i.e., consent was given after injury but before
treatment.' These are powerful statistics because they demonstrate that the granting
of consent is not assured. Any presumption about what a subject may or may not do
is not necessarily accurate.
The researchers presented a proposed master framework for obtaining consent. 345
Ultimately, however, this framework was not implemented because the sponsor
terminated the study early. 346 The framework, however, contained the seeds of an
excellent practical program, including the use of a consent exception verification
form. 7 The form was designed to document how the exception's requirements were
met and to ensure that the exception was used appropriately. 348 The form was to be

335. 21 C.F.R. § 312.20(c).
336. 21 C.F.R. § 50.24(d).
337. See Tanner, supra note 313.
338. Edward P. Sloan et al., The Informed ConsentProcessand the Use ofthe Exception to Informed Consent
in the Clinical Trial of DiaspirinCross-linked Hemoglobin (DCLHb) in Severe Traumatic HemorrhagicShock, 6
ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1203, 1203--04 (1999).
339. Id. at 1204.
340. Id. at 1206.
341. Id. at 1207 ("The [consent to continue] mechanism offered three options: 1) full continued participation,
2) participation only for safety assessment, or 3) refusal to continue study participation."). Consent to continue is
also known as "retroactive consent." See British Ass'n for Behavioural & Cognitive Psychotherapies, Guidelines
for Good Practice, http://www.babcp.org.uk/joining/goodpractice.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2006).
342. Sloan et al., supra note 338, at 1205.
343. Id.
344. See id. Notably, the study concluded that there was "strong adherence" to the regulations' requirements
for informed consent. Id. at 1206. Also, the process "met with near uniform approval" by the patients approached
to give consent. Id. at 1208.
345. Edward P. Sloan et al., A Proposed Consent Process in Studies That Use an Exception to Informed
Consent, 6 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1283 (1999).

346. Id. at 1290. Sloan's article includes a decision tree for obtaining informed consent. Id. at 1284.
347. Id. at 1290.
348. Id.
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completed by the researcher, a physician unaffiliated with the study, and a
witness.349

Not all of the additional protections for subjects under the emergency research
exception are effective. One example of this is the need for consultation with the
community, which may be problematic for IRBs and researchers.35 ° "Community
consultation" serves several purposes. Primarily, it exists to provide special
protections for vulnerable populations, as well as to obtain informed consent from
the community at large.35 ' It is, like informed consent, a process.352 It is not achieved
by erecting a billboard or by placing an ad in the newspaper-it is not to be
confused with simple public notification.353 Instead, the investigator must consider

the group that the study focuses on and target it accordingly.35 4 The FDA rule,
however, does not prescribe how to perform community consultation.355 Instead,
researchers are left to construct a process themselves,356 which can prove

problematic when less scrupulous researchers are involved. Commonly recognized
methods for obtaining appropriate community consent include holding town
meetings, conducting panel discussions with community representatives, and placing
community representatives on the IRBs.3 57

There are two essential steps to community consultation. 358 First, the community
must be identified.3 59 "The ideal community is representative of the patients most
likely to be enrolled in the proposed research study.''360 Second, the researchers and
the IRB must gather demographic, socioeconomic, and other information regarding
349. Id. ("The regulations require that an independent physician (such as an IRB member) verify that the
consent exception is appropriate for the study, but do not require that an independent physician or another witness
verify that the consent exception is appropriate for each individual patient....").
350. See Charles Marwick, FDA Gets Feedback on Informed Consent Waiver, 275 JAMA 347, 347 (1996)
("Manufacturers worried that disclosure might reveal trade secrets, while researchers.. .noted that ensuring public
disclosure could be difficult.").
351. See Tanner, supra note 313.
352. See 21 CFR § 50.24 (a)(7)(i)-(iv) (2004). However, it "does not preempt existing state regulations if
waiver of informed consent for research is not allowed." Michelle H. Biros et al., Implementing the Food and Drug
Administration's Final Rule for Waiver of Informed Consent in Certain Emergency Research Circumstances, 6
ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1272, 1274 (1999). This seems logical considering that the purpose behind community
consultation is to respect the mores and structure of a community and to overrule a community/state law with a
federal regulation would be antithetical to that respect.
353. See Biros et al., supra note 352, at 1274; Marwick, supra note 350, at 347. "We can't help wondering
if the institutional review boards [IRBs], sponsors, and researchers are taking the rule seriously, when the only
evidence we see of community consultation is an advertisement in the newspaper." Marwick, supra note 263, at
1392-93 (alteration in original). Similarly, the Deputy FDA Commissioner related a story involving her local
hospital, which "advertised it was conducting a trial of a life-saving emergency therapy, but gave no contact
information." Alicia Ault, FDA May "Pull the Plug" on Consent Waiver, 350 LANCET 1084, 1084 (1997).
354. See Jill M. Baren et al., An Approach to Community Consultation Prior to Initiating an Emergency
Research Study Incorporating a Waiver of Informed Consent, 6 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1210, 1211 (1999).
355. See Ault, supra note 353, at 1084.
356. Just as in the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, and the Belmont Report. See supra Parts
Ill.A. 1, 111.A.2, IHL.A.4.
357. See Baren et al., supra note 354, at 1211. A criticism of the provision is that "the regulations provide
no guidelines as to who are 'representatives of the community' from which the subjects will be drawn, nor any
explanation of how 'communities' are defined." Carnahan, supra note 29, at 582.
358. See Baren et al., supra note 354, at 1213.
359. Id.
360. Id. But "[b]ecause the definitions of community differ tremendously from site to site and from project
to project, the FDA has not yet provided specific guidelines on how such consultation can be obtained." Biros et
al., supra note 352, at 1276.
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" ' The information must be sufficient to educate
the composition of the community.36
the IRB about the effect of its decision to approve or deny the research study and
should include data on distinguishing characteristics of consenting and nonconsenting community members.362
An analysis of one of the recent programs qualifying for the FDA waiver is
illustrative of the process for community consultation. Several years ago, Northfield
Laboratories began clinical trials for PolyHeme, an artificial blood substitute to be
administered to trauma victims in several major metropolitan areas across the United
States. 363 Virtually all citizens were automatically included in the study as a result
of the application of the emergency treatment exception to informed consent.
Only a few groups were excluded, such as minors, pregnant women, people with
terminal injuries, and Jehovah's Witnesses.365 The exception derives from the fact
that, as trauma victims, these patients are incapable of giving consent due to shock
and sustained blood loSS. 366 Community consultation meetings were held at churches
and civic organizations in each community where the trials were to take place in
order to educate the community about the study.367 Northfield Laboratories also
advertised the trial on its website, including information regarding the trial's
361
qualification for exception from the informed consent requirements. In this case,
it seems that community consultation is continuing successfully.
The same cannot be said for the results of PolyHeme clinical trial results, which
are disturbing. Ten of eighty-one patients participating in the initial trial suffered
heart attacks within one week of being administered the blood substitute, and two
of those ten later died, while all those study participants who did not receive
PolyHeme suffered no cardiac events.369 Yet the FDA continued to allow Northfield
Laboratories to test the blood substitute under the emergency exception.37 °
Detractors of the emergency research process are quick to point to the "slippery
slope that's essentially demolishing [the] individual right not to become
experimental subjects., 371 They emphasize that individual autonomy is severely
compromised by implementing the exception via community consultation.372 But

361. Baren et al., supra note 354, at 1213.
362. Id.
363. See Northfield Laboratories, Product Description, http://www.northfieldlabs.com/polyheme.html (last
visited Oct. 7, 2006); Craig Malisow, Bloodless Coup, HOUSTON PRESS, Mar. 4, 2004, at 16, available at
http://www.houstonpress.com/Issues/2004-03-04/news/news.html.
The results of the first trial generated controversy that continues today, involving Charles Grassley,
Chairman of the U.S. Senate Finance Committee, the Office of Human Research Protections, and the FDA. See
Thomas M. Burton, AmidAlarm Bells, a Blood Substitute Keeps Pumping, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2006, at Al; Jeff
Nesmith, Artificial Blood Trial Called Unethical, Cox NEWS SERV., Mar. 19, 2006, http://www.coxwashington
.comlnews/contentlreporters/stories/2006/03/19/BC_-ARTIFICIAL.BLOODl9_COX.html.
364. See Malisow, supra note 363, at 16.
365. See id.
366. Nesmith, supra note 363.
367. See Burton, supra note 363, at Al.
368. Northfield Laboratories, PolyHeme Pivotal Phase II Trial, http://www.northfieldlabs.com/amb_trial.htm
(last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
369. See Burton, supra note 363, at Al.
370. Thomas M. Burton, Blood-Substitute Study Is Criticized by U.S. Agency, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2006,
at A3.
371. See Tanner, supra note 313.
372. Id.
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others have responded: "What you do when you want to sacrifice one good to
achieve another... is you set up very rigorous review processes to reach a judgment
that the one good is worth sacrificing for the other. And you make people justify
'
that."373
The initial criticism that a slippery slope is created is compelling. The
compromise of individual autonomy is terribly significant in this case. By instituting
the community consultation provision, one who truly dissents from participation in
the study runs a substantial risk of enrollment, regardless of her opinion. And that
is wrong.374
C. TherapeuticPrivilege
1. In the Treatment Context
Therapeutic privilege, inherent in all therapy givers, is a third exception to the
requirement of informed consent.375 The therapeutic privilege permits a physician
to withhold harmful information from the patient-even if disclosure of that
information would normally be required.376 The therapeutic privilege conforms to
the Hippocratic Oath-an oath that all physicians take requiring them to do no harm
to their patients.377 If the provision of information were to cause harm to the patient,
then the Hippocratic Oath would be violated. The exception obviates that possibility.
The landmark case of Canterbury v. Spence cautioned that the physician's
discretion to withhold information must be carefully limited.37 This is because "'[a]
number of cases appear to have confused the proper relationship of the privilege to
informed consent, primarily by allowing the privilege to be used if the patient's
subsequent choice would be detrimental"' to his health.379 Instead, Canterbury
provides for non-disclosure of risk information only.380 Information on treatment
options and benefits are less likely to cause harm to the patient; thus, they receive
less scrutiny under the exception than information on potential risks.38 '

373. See Malisow, supra note 363, at 17; see also Steeves, supra note 234 (addressing philosophical
arguments for and against the emergency waiver).
374. The response to this criticism is that the dissenter may opt out of the study by the wearing of a wristband
indicating his wishes. But it is impractical to wear a wristband for each study in which one does not desire to
participate. This places a burden on the individual that does not exist elsewhere. Why should the burden be on the
passive citizen? The burden to accommodate the dissenters should be on the party taking the affirmative action--the
researchers.

375. See, e.g., Meisel, supra note 5, at 460.
376. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D:C. Cir. 1972) ("It is recognized that patients
occasionally become so ill or emotionally distraught on disclosure as to foreclose a rational decision, or complicate
or hinder the treatment, or perhaps even pose psychological damage to the patient."); Nishi v. Hartwell, 473 P.2d
116, 120, 123 (Haw. 1970), overruled on other groundsby Carr v. Strock, 904 P.2d 489 (Haw. 1995).
377. See Meisel, supra note 5, at 460-61. See generally Nancy Rice, Comment, Informed Consent: The
Illusion of PatientChoice, 23 EMORY L.J. 503 (1974) (analyzing the relationship between therapeutic privilege and
informed consent).
378. Canterbury,464 F.2d at 789 ("[For] otherwise it might devour the disclosure rule itself.").
379. See Meisel, supra note 5, at 461 n.155 (quoting Rice, supra note 377, at 506).
380. Canterbury,464 F.2d at 789.
381. See Meisel, supranote 5, at 464.
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2. In the Research Context
The therapeutic privilege is neither appropriate nor recognized in the research
context because of the additional information that is required to be provided to
research subjects. The privilege should rarely be employed in the treatment context
and should never be employed in the case of human experimentation.3 82 The
therapeutic privilege protects against the provision of the very information that a
researcher is required to provide to her subjects-information on potential risks and
harm that might arise as a result of the research.3" 3 Thus, the researcher cannot rely
on the therapeutic privilege when conducting research.
D. Waiver
1. In the Treatment Context
The fourth recognized exception is patient waiver of the informed consent
requirement. 38 Waiver generally occurs when there is a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment of a known right.38 5 With the right to informed consent, the focus is
on the autonomy of the patient.386 To ensure autonomy in her decision-making, the
patient is entitled to all material information regarding her condition before making
a treatment decision. 387 This material information includes notification that
caregivers have a duty to disclose information regarding the treatment, that patients
have the right to make decisions regarding their treatment, that consent must be
given by the patient prior to care commencing, and that patients have the right to
consent to, or to refuse care.388
Despite the focus on patient autonomy, a huge potential still exists for the
physician to exert influence over her patient's decisions. Additional physician duties
include conveying accurate information that properly reflects the current condition
and situation of the patient.389 Further, the physician should maintain an awareness
of how much influence her words and advice have on her patient.? She must
remember that a patient who simply requires assistance in decision making is not
waiving the right to decide.39'
Once accurate information is conveyed, patients may waive the right to receive
information regarding their care, waive the right to make decisions regarding their
care, or both.392 Patients who waive the right to information but retain decisionmaking authority are the most challenging for physicians.393 This challenge

382. Cf id. at 466 ("But where the need for medical care is not urgent, the therapeutic privilege should rarely,
if ever, be used.").
383. See supra Part I.C.
384. See, e.g., Meisel, supra note 5, at 453-60
385. 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 197 (2003).
386. BERG ET AL., supra note 197, at 85.
387. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 835 (Md. 2001).
388. BERGETAL., supra note 197, at 85.
389. See id. at 86-87 (listing material facts about the nature of the treatment).
390. Id. at 88.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. See id. at 89.
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invariably arises because the patient is then making decisions with incomplete
information." The physician is faced with implementing a patient's treatment
decision that might not be the most effective. To maintain the value of patient
autonomy, however, physicians must follow the requests of their patients.
2. In the Research Context
IRBs ensure that proper informed consent is obtained from research subjects.395
The Code of Federal Regulations provides for the IRB's waiver of the informed
consent requirement in situations where the IRB determines that informed consent
is unnecessary.3 96 To meet the waiver guidelines, the ERB must find that (1) there is
only minimal risk to the subjects, (2) waiver of informed consent would have no
adverse effect on the subjects, and (3) it is impractical to enact the study without the
waiver.397 If the IRB makes these findings, then it may waive the informed consent
requirement for studies falling under its purview.398
Waiver of informed consent in the research context is distinguished from the
exception to informed consent that exists in the emergency research context. The
requirements for waiver are less stringent than for the emergency exception. 399 IRBs
may use waiver when there is only minimal risk to the subjects, while the
emergency exception is employed only for life-threatening situations.
3. For National Security Purposes
The concept of waiver as it relates to national security has become increasingly
important. Informed consent has been, and continues to be, an issue for service
members in the U.S. military since World War II.4 A recent example of this
military waiver occurred during the Gulf War. Suits brought after the war by
servicemen alleged that the government had failed to obtain their informed consent
prior to their exposure to investigational drugs believed to be effective against

394.
395.
396.
397.

Id. at 89-90. In these cases, a third party should process information. Id.
See supra Part l.D.
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d) (2005).
Id. § 46.116(d)(l)-(4). Specifically, the statute states that
[an IRB may approve a consent procedure which does not include, or which alters, some or all
of the elements of informed consent set forth in this section, or waive the requirements to obtain
informed consent provided the IRB finds and documents that: (1) The research involves no more
than minimal risks to the subjects; (2) The waiver or alteration will not adversely affect the rights
and welfare of the subjects; (3) The research could not practicably be carried out without the
waiver or alteration; and (4) Whenever appropriate, the subjects will be provided with additional
pertinent information after participation.

Id.
398. For examples of specific documentation that IRBs may commonly require, see Auburn Univ., Waiver
of Consent Form by IRB, Auburn University, http://web.archive.orglweb/20050210173553/http:/
/www.auburn.edu/research/vpr/ohs/consent/waiver.htm (last visited Jan.. 9, 2007); Univ. of Neb.-Uncoln, IRB
Waiver of Informed Consent Investigator Form, http://www.unl.edu/research/orr/Waiver.pdf (last visited Sept. 9,
2006).
399. See supra Part IV.B.2.
400. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS, 103D CONG., IS MILITARY RESEARCH HAzARDous

TO VETERANS' HEALTH? LESSONS SPANNING HALF A CENTURY (Comm. Print 1994), available at http://www.
gulfweb.org/bigdoc/rockrep.cfm.
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biochemical toxins. 40' The Department of Defense exposed the military members to
the drugs based on FDA Rule 23(d), "which allow[ed] the Commissioner of Food
and Drugs to waive the informed consent requirement for the use of investigational
drugs where certain battlefield or combat-related situations render consent 'not
feasible."' 40 2
In Doe v. Sullivan, the plaintiff, a serviceman, claimed that the phrase "not
feasible" referred to the capacity of an individual to give informed consent, and thus
Rule 23(d) was violated because informed consent had not been obtained.4 3 The
FDA, however, contended that the phrase included "impracticable" situations,
including "a combat zone setting, the safety of military personnel at that location,
and the compelling need to promote success of the service members' mission. '
The D.C. Circuit Court ultimately held that the military could not be enjoined from
the use of investigational drugs on its soldiers without their consent.4 5
Today, servicemen are protected from the administration of investigational or
unapproved drugs without the opportunity for informed consent by federal statute.4°6
Waiver of informed consent may only be given by the servicemen themselves or the
President of the United States.40 7 The President may grant a waiver only "when
absolutely necessary."4 8 A recent suit, Doe #1 v. Rumsfeld, resulted from the
Defense Department's requirement that servicemen submit to anthrax
vaccinations. 4°9 At the time that the suit was brought, the drug to be administered
was not licensed for use as an anthrax vaccination and, thus, the plaintiff contended,
was experimental. 4'0 This use violated 10 U.S.C. § 1107, which prohibits the use of
investigational or unapproved new drugs on members of the military without their
consent.411 The Defense Department maintained that obtaining informed consent
from every service member would "interfere with the smooth functioning of the
military. ' 41 2 The federal district court was not persuaded and issued a preliminary

401. Patrick J. Moran, Comment, A Military Exception to "Informed Consent": Doe v. Sullivan, 66 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 847, 851-53 (1992).
402. Id.; see also Alicia Ault, FDA Seeks Comment on Gulf War Waiver, 350 LANCET 421 (1997).
403. Moran, supra note 401, at 858. Clearly the plaintiffs claim was supported by the Code of Federal
Regulations. Id. at 858 n.59.
404. Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
405. Id. at 1371.
406. Doe #1 v. Rumsfeld, 297 F. Supp. 2d 119, 125 (D.D.C. 2003) (mem.) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1107 (2000)),
stay granted,297 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D.D.C. 2004).
407. Id.
[T]he President may waive the prior consent requirement for the administration of an
investigational new drug to a member of the armed forces in connection with the member's
participation in a particular military operation... .[O]nly the President may waive informed
consent in this connection and the President may grant such a waiver only if the President
determines in writing that obtaining consent: Is not feasible; is contrary to the best interests of
the military member; or is not in the interests of national security.
21 C.F.R. § 50.23(d)(1) (2006).
408. Doe #1,297 F. Supp. 2d at 125 (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,139, 3 C.F.R. 221 (2000), reprintedin 10
U.S.C. § 1107 (2000)).
409. Id. at 122.
410. Id. at 123.
411. Id. at 131-32. Put another way, the statute was enacted "to protect soldiers from involuntarily serving
as 'guinea pigs' in a mass use of investigational medicine." Id. at 134.
412.

Id.
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injunction barring the vaccinations.4 13 The court subsequently stayed the injunction
because immediately thereafter the FDA categorized the vaccine as safe and
effective.4" 4 The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and
rejected the FDA's rule based on the fact that the public was not given an
opportunity to comment on the FDA's proposed action, as required by FDA
regulations.4" 5 Importantly, as global stability becomes less certain, more men and
women may volunteer or be called to serve in the armed forces, making the concept
of waiver in the armed forces increasingly important.
V.,. HIPAA AND RESEARCH
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996416 is
designed to protect the health information of patients and research subjects. 417 The
Privacy Rule,418 a regulation promulgated pursuant to HIPAA, outlines the situations
where providers and researchers can use protected health information (PHI) 41 9 and
establishes standards for the protection of individually identifiable health
information.420 The goal of the Privacy Rule is to "define and limit the circumstances
in which an individual's protected health information may be used or disclosed. 421
The Privacy Rule, which became effective on April 14, 2003, strikes a balance
between the privacy rights of an individual and the need for providers and
researchers to use healthcare information. 422 "The Privacy Rule recognizes that the
research community has legitimate needs to use, access, and disclose individually
identifiable health information to carry out a wide range of health research protocols
and projects. ' '423 "In order for a research subject to give truly 'informed' consent, the
subject is entitled to know how their [sic] private information-PHI-will be used
in the research study."4' 24 HIPAA attached a supplemental, separate requirement of

413. Id. at 135. "The [c]ourt is persuaded that the right to bodily integrity and the importance of complying
with legal requirements, even in the face of requirements that may potentially be inconvenient or burdensome, are
among the highest public policy concerns one could articulate." ledat 134.
414. Doe #1 v. Rumsfeld, 297 F. Supp. 2d 200, 200 (D.D.C. 2004). The district court termed the timing of
the issuance of the determination "highly suspicious." Id.
415. Doe #1 v. Rumsfeld, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19 (D.D.C. 2004), remanded, Doe #1 v. Rumsfeld, 172 F. App'x
327 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (holding appeal moot because the FDA passed a rule meeting the district court's
requirements).
416. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42
U.S.C.).
417. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvS., PROTECTING PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION IN
RESEARCH: UNDERSTANDING THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE at i (2003), available at http://privacyruleandresearch.nih

.gov/pdf/HIPAA.Booklet.4-14-2003.pdf
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INFORMATION

IN

RESEARCH].
418. U.S. DEP'T OFHEALTH&HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OFTHE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 1(2003), available
at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacysummary.pdf.
419. Id. "Covered entities" under the Privacy Rule include "health plans, health care clearinghouses, and any
health care provider who transmits health information in electronic form." Id. at 2.
420. Id. at 1. The Privacy Rule refers to information that can be used to identify an individual as "protected
health information." Id. at 3-4. This information includes demographic data, as well as information concerning an
individual's physical or mental health status, information concerning the provision of health care to the individual,
and information regarding payment for the care. Id. at 4.
421. Id.
422. PROTECTING PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION IN RESEARCH,supra note 417, at i.
423. Id. at 2.
424. Univ. of S. Fla.,
Can I Include the HIPAA Authorization as Part of the Informed Consent Document?,
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obtaining a subject's consent to use or disclose the subject's PHI used during the
study.425 This notice must be provided to the subject in writing.426 The regulations
permit the use of a "combined form" that covers informed consent for research and
authorization for the use of PHI.427 Organizations, however, are eschewing the use
of a combined form because it would require IRBs to review subject authorizations
under HIPAA, in addition to their responsibility for ensuring informed consent.428
HIPAA currendy does not empower IRBs to regulate the subject authorizations.429
The Privacy Rule functions concurrently with any other state or federal laws and
regulations. 4

°

It serves to supplement the Common Rule such that "some

researchers who are also (or who work for) covered entities may find themselves
responsible for complying with multiple sets of regulations."43 ' It is important to
note that the Privacy Rule does not apply to research; rather, it applies to "health
plans, health care clearinghouses, and certain health care providers. 4 3 2 Thus, the
process of research itself is not regulated by the Rule, rather the Rule regulates
researchers' access to PHI. 433 Researchers qualify as covered entities if they are
health care providers who electronically transmit health information.434
The Rule gives individuals the opportunity to sign an authorization form that
allows for the use and disclosure of their PHI. 43" The distinction here between

http://www.research.usf.edu/cs/hipaa_forms/combined.doc (last visited Sept. 11, 2006). The following information
must be included in a HIPAA-compliant authorization document:
" A description of the information to be used or disclosed in connection with the research
project that identifies the information in a specific and meaningful fashion.
" The name of the person authorized to make the requested use or disclosure.
• The name of the person to whom the requested uses or disclosures may be made.
" A description of each purpose of the requested use or disclosure.
" An expiration date or an expiration event that relates to the individual or the purpose of the
use or disclosure.
" Signature of the patient/potential subject and date.
Univ. of Mich. Med. Sch., Additional Requirements for Informed Consent Documents Under HIPAA (2003),
http://www.med.umich.edu/irbmed/ict/ICD-HIPAA-REQS.pdf (citing 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116-. 117 (2005)).
The following notifications must also be included:
" The patient's right to revoke the authorization in writing.
" Notification of the consequences of refusal to sign the authorization.
• Any information disclosed pursuant to the patient's authorization may be subject to
disclosure by the recipient and no longer protected by HIPAA.
Id. Finally, the research subject must be provided with a copy of the signed authorization. Id.
425. Univ. of Mich. Med. Sch., supra note 424.
426. PROTECTING PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION IN RESEARCH, supra note 417, at 19.
427. See Univ. of S. Fla., supra note 424.
428. See id. "By keeping these two processes separated, the IRB will not be burdened with additional tasks
that might detract from their important role in human subject protection." Id.
429. See Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
430. See PROTECTING PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION IN RESEARCH, supra note 417, at 3. "The Privacy
Rule does not change current requirements that specify when researchers must submit protocols to the IRB for
review and approval, and obtain informed consent documents." Id. at 13.
431. Id. at3.
432. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2005).
433. PROTECTING PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION IN RESEARCH, supra note 417, at 5.
434. Id. "For example, physicians who conduct clinical studies or administer experimental therapeutics to
participants during the course of a study must comply with the Privacy Rule if they meet the HIPAA definition of
a covered entity." Id.
435. Id. at 11. "When an Authorization is obtained for research purposes, the Privacy Rule requires that it
pertain only to a specific research study, not to nonspecific research or to future, unspecified projects." Id.
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authorization and informed consent is that authorization "focuses on privacy risks
and states how, why, and to whom the PHI will be used and/or disclosed for
research. 436 Informed consent primarily describes the study and its potential risks
and benefits. Similar to informed consent, however, the authorization requirement
may be waived under certain conditions.437
While some federal and state regulations require informed consent to include
information on privacy and confidentiality, the Privacy Rule formalizes those
requirements. While it does not replace the already existing requirements, it adds a
valuable layer that ensures a subject's protection during research studies.
VI. CONCLUSION
Informed consent in the treatment context has a different purpose than in the
research context. Treatment is focused on the health of the individual patient, while
research is focused on improving the health of society as a whole. Because the focus
is not on the individual during research, the potential for injury exists. Because the
potential for injury exists, additional protections are necessary for the research
subject. While safeguards such as IRBs can provide benefit to the subjects,
sometimes they do not function as designed-leaving the research subject without
necessary protection. Similarly, exceptions to informed consent are also different in
the treatment context than in the research context. The research exceptions again
require additional protection for the subjects, such as community consultation. These
additional protections for the exceptions do not always function as designed. History
has not been kind to researchers who work without the informed consent of their
subjects.
The exceptions to informed consent in the treatment context provide direct
benefit to the patient. When the health of the patient is at stake, physicians must be
allowed to minister to them free from the requirements of informed consent. It is
difficult to argue otherwise-thus, the exceptions for informed consent to treatment
should stand.
In the research context, however, the focus is primarily on the social benefits of
the research, not the individual subject's well-being. As we move further into the
age of genomic medicine and designer drugs, the demand for human research
subjects will inevitably increase. Similarly, as drugs are able to target a disease with
greater specificity, the pool of subjects infected with a specific disease may be
smaller. Thus, the demand for the creation of additional exceptions to informed
consent will increase to ensure the availability of adequate subject pools. Ultimately
these exceptions could swallow the rule, rendering it meaningless and leaving
research subjects without protection.438

436. Id.
437. See id. at 13. The Privacy Rule creates Privacy Boards, analogous to IRBs, to review requests for waiver

or alteration of the Authorization requirement. Id. Membership composition of Privacy Boards is analogous to that
of an IRB. See id. Criteria for waiver or alteration are also similar to that for informed consent. There must be no
more than a minimal risk to the privacy of an individual, the research could not be practicably conducted without
the waiver or alteration, or the research could not be practicably conducted without access to the PHI. Id. at 14.
438. To highlight these problems, one group of authors provided a tongue-in-cheek compendium of informed
consent statements. These included "[h]uman sacrifice randomised controlled trial consent" and the "[r]andomised
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To ensure that the exceptions to informed consent do not swallow the doctrine,
limits to the exceptions should be enacted in the research context. Informed consent
for research studies should be limited to three categories: (1) informed consent is
obtained from the subject; (2) informed consent is obtained from a surrogate or legal
representative; and (3) informed consent is not obtained. If the subject falls into the
first two categories, then research may proceed. If the subject falls into the third
category and informed consent is not obtained, then the subject should be removed
from further consideration in the study.
The existing exceptions to informed consent in the research context should be
abolished. Some would argue that this will negatively affect research studies by
delaying study completion. In the absence of the application of an exception,
researchers may lose the subjects who qualify for the study but who cannot enroll
because of the lack of informed consent. With the abolition of these exceptions, the
research study's enrollment period would increase because the present exceptions
would not apply to facilitate the enrollment of subjects in the studies. The research,
however, would eventually still proceed. A lengthier enrollment period will
compromise no one and likely will not affect the research itself. Further, individual
autonomy, the most precious of values, remains respected. The right to control one's
own body is not infringed upon by instituting these exceptions. Physicians and
researchers, or patients and subjects, would be free to move medicine and science
forward at no individual's expense.

controlled trial consent for stockholding investigators." Andrew Oxman et al., A Practical Guide to Informed
Consent to Treatment, 323 BRITISH MED. J. 1464, 1464 (2001). While clearly a satirical view, the article
nevertheless casts an interesting light on differing views of the informed consent process.

